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INTRODUCTION
Congress frequently enacts legislation containing gaps or inconsistencies that cannot be resolved through techniques of statutory interpretation.1
The typical judicial reaction is to try to force meaning from the statute by
applying some canon of construction or interpretive theory, even when the
statute and its legislative history are silent or conflicted on the issue.2 Occasionally, judges will openly admit the impossibility of ascertaining legislative meaning and conclude their opinions by calling for Congress to clarify
statutory language.3 Yet because they must resolve the cases before them,
judges are still faced with the task of extracting meaning from an inscrutable statute.
Legal scholars have engaged in a vibrant discourse about the best
methods of resolving statutory ambiguity. Much of the debate has focused
on the two most widely accepted interpretive theories—textualism and intentionalism.4 Both schools incorporate the canons of construction, which
have themselves been the subject of long debate. More recently, proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation have moved beyond discussion of
hermeneutics and have claimed that courts have the authority to update
vague or open-ended statutes to acknowledge changed circumstances or to
better accord with evolved social standards.5 The scholars in all these
1

See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges Who Can’t And Legislators Who
Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792 (1963) (“My criticism is directed rather at cases in which the legislature has said enough to deprive the judges of power to make law even in such subordinate respects but
has given them guidance that is defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way of remedy when the problem comes to light.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit
Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987) (“The national legislature expresses itself too often in
commands that are unclear, imprecise, or gap-ridden; in too many cases, as Chief Justice Rehnquist once
wrote, ‘[t]he effort to determine congressional intent . . . might better be entrusted to a detective than to
a judge.’”); John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1280 & n.43 (1996)
(“[T]he courts complain of ambiguous statutory language daily.”).
2
See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.
3
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2624 (2005) (noting that
28 U.S.C. § 1367 may contain an “unintentional drafting gap” but concluding that “[i]f that is the case, it
is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it”); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 603–04
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If adjustment [of the statute] is in order, as the Court’s opinion powerfully suggests it is, Congress is equipped to undertake the alteration.”); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (“If Congress erred, however, it is for that body, and not this Court, to correct its
mistake.”); Abdul-Malik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that sentencing statutes raise separation of powers and federalism concerns, and “invit[ing] congressional consideration of
these statutes”).
4
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419–20 (2005)
(describing the two dominant interpretive methodologies as textualism and intentionalism).
5
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) [hereinafter, ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION]; RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Estimating].
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camps base their critiques of the status quo and proposals for change on
their view of the role judges should play in the American system of government.6
This Article proposes another solution to the problem of intractable
statutory ambiguity—a solution that reflects a different normative view
about the place of the judiciary in our constitutional structure. When a federal court must construe a statute that leaves important issues about its application unclear, the court should have the option to stay the case and refer
the question to Congress, much in the same way that courts now use abstention and certification to obtain answers about the meaning of state law from
state courts. Congress may then resolve the ambiguity by amending the law
in accordance with Article I’s bicameralism and presidential presentment
requirements, after which the court can (in fact, usually must) apply the new
law to the pending case.7
Sending truly ambiguous statutes to Congress for clarification is the
best use of courts’ and Congress’s institutional competences. Federal
judges, valued for their independence from politics and public opinion,
have neither the expertise nor the authority to engage in the kind of substantive lawmaking that is required when they must apply a statute containing
significant gaps or conflicting language. The legislative branch, on the
other hand, has the investigative capabilities and connections with the
community to assist it in policymaking, and its members can be held accountable for their choices by the electorate. Furthermore, sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a more honest response to
truly opaque statutes than attempts at interpretation; when courts use the
canons of construction or theories of interpretation to find meaning where
there is none, they undermine the legitimacy of these important interpretive
tools. Finally, sending questions to Congress provides Congress with an incentive to take immediate action to avoid a judicial decision that might establish new law and create new stakeholders, making a congressional
override difficult. At the very least, the process will alert Congress to the
problems in legislative texts and hopefully inspire it to do a better job when
drafting future legislation.8
When judges devote so much of their time and energy to ascertaining
congressional intent and parsing meaning from indeterminate statutory lan6

As one scholar in this area has declared, “[i]n the end, the quest for statutory meaning in the absence of formal legislative evidence reduces to a debate over the proper role that courts should play in
construing statutes.” Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1389, 1437 (2005).
7
See discussion infra Parts III–IV. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, there is some tension between the principle that courts must apply new law to pending cases and the presumption against retroactivity. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994). However, if Congress is clear that
it wishes the law to apply retroactively, and Congress has not transgressed the “modest” constitutional
limitations on its power to do so, then the Court must apply the new law to pending cases. Id. at 272.
8
See discussion infra Part V.A.
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guage, it is strange not to at least consider bringing the problem to the attention of the very political branches imbued with the authority to resolve that
ambiguity definitively. Yet courts have never referred ambiguous statutes
to Congress for amendment, and the academic literature contains only a few
passing references to the concept.9 The reluctance to entertain the idea may
stem from a sense that courts should not be asking Congress to enact laws
that resolve pending cases; the U.S. Constitution carefully separates the
lawmaking and judicial functions, and those lines might be blurred if Congress is encouraged to craft legislation concerning a dispute in a case before
a court.10 But even as courts and commentators have overlooked or rejected
the possibility of referring ambiguous statutes to Congress, on many occasions Congress has recognized judicial confusion about the meaning of legislation and amended unclear statutory language.11 Considering that
Congress is already assisting courts by amending legislation at issue in
pending cases—albeit in an informal and ad hoc way—this Article argues
in favor of a formal certification process that would give the courts a role in
selecting the cases in which congressional assistance would be helpful.
Part I of this Article provides a detailed description of the certification
process that courts should employ when faced with a truly inscrutable statute.
Part II.A discusses the causes of statutory ambiguity, ranging from innocent drafting errors to deliberate legislative choices to leave language unclear, and describes the different schools of statutory interpretation that
courts employ to resolve ambiguities. Part II.B then illustrates the problems
posed by truly opaque statutes by describing three Supreme Court cases
from the October 2004 Term in which the Court struggled to resolve the
meaning of unclear statutory language using these traditional methods of
statutory interpretation.
9

See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162,
2180–81 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting] (commenting that a “more straightforward
approach” to the problem of statutory ambiguity might be to certify questions to Congress); Gregory E.
Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts
Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 173 (1992) (suggesting at the end of an article on the costs
of statutory ambiguity that federal courts might consider certifying questions of statutory meaning to
Congress).
10
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–34 (1995) (holding that the Constitution did not permit Congress to enact legislation that would set aside the final judgment of an Article III
court); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislatures and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1093 (1991) (raising the concern that “the
active involvement of judges in legislative forums [could] affect the judges’ ability to resolve disputes
from the bench”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1998) (“Traditionally, most academics and judges have viewed the legislative role as quite separate and distinct from the judicial role: judges are not to exercise directly
legislative powers and legislators are not to mandate the outcome of particular cases or controversies
pending before the federal courts.”).
11
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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Part III proposes certifying questions to Congress as an alternative
method of dealing with ambiguous statutes. This Part draws a connection
between judicial referrals to Congress and the theories supporting federal
courts’ use of abstention and certification to provide an opportunity for state
courts to decide difficult questions of state law. Although there are important differences between the two types of abstention, sending questions to
Congress can be justified by many of the same rationales that underlie certifying questions about the meaning of state law to state courts. This Part
concludes by describing Congress’s long history of taking notice of judicial
confusion and acting to resolve statutory ambiguity—sometimes on the eve
of a circuit court or Supreme Court decision on the matter. In light of this
well-established practice, it makes sense to develop a system by which
courts can seek congressional assistance in cases of their choosing by certifying questions to Congress.
Part IV addresses the constitutional concerns raised by certifying questions to Congress, and describes the ways in which the process could be
structured to avoid an impermissible intermingling of the functions of the
legislative and judicial branches.
Part V engages in a normative analysis of the proposal: Assuming that
certifying questions to Congress can be structured so as to pass constitutional muster—as I argue it can be—would giving Congress an opportunity
to weigh in on pending cases be wise? Judicial referrals to Congress are a
more democratic, and more honest, means to address statutory ambiguity
than the current system under which courts employ complex and conflicting
canons and theories of statutory interpretation to arrive at a statutory meaning that no elected body enacted into law. On the other hand, Congress
may not be at its best when legislating in the shadow of pending cases, and
transferring cases from the (relatively) apolitical judicial branch to the nakedly political legislative branch puts unpopular and unsophisticated litigants at a disadvantage. Furthermore, certification will inevitably cause
delay in the resolution of the cases in which it is used. To illustrate these
points, this Part returns to the three cases discussed in Part II to describe
how certification might have resolved the questions about statutory meaning raised in those cases.
I conclude that certifying questions to Congress would be a valuable
addition to the judicial arsenal, but that it should be used sparingly and with
caution. Certification is worthwhile when it would allow a court to avoid
difficult constitutional questions or would give Congress and the President
a role in deciding significant issues of policy best addressed in the first instance by the political branches. On the other side of the spectrum, certification might also make sense in cases in which the statute contains a minor
technical error that can be quickly and easily resolved through an amendment. Congress should not be consulted, however, when the litigants possess widely differing degrees of political influence or when Congress might
be expected to act hastily to satisfy shifting and tyrannical majority prefer5
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ences. Admittedly, distinguishing these cases will not always be easy, but I
argue that it is a more honest exercise than one in which the courts seek to
glean meaning from a statute that contains none.
The Article closes by discussing the problem of congressional inaction.
If a court certified a question to Congress that Congress chose not to answer—a situation that might occur frequently—I contend that Congress’s
silence would serve as an implicit delegation of legislative power to the
courts. Judges could then engage in more freewheeling and creative reading of legislation than would be justified had Congress not first turned
down the opportunity to amend ambiguous statutory language. Moreover,
simply by referring questions to Congress, judges will have bought themselves some political cover against charges of judicial activism for filling
gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in ambiguous statutes. For that reason,
the value of certification is two-fold: In some cases, Congress will step in
to provide a legislative solution; in all the rest, Congress’s silence will empower courts to openly legislate rather than do so in the guise of “statutory
construction,” as occurs now.
I. THE PROPOSAL
Judicial certification to Congress could be established either by legislation or possibly through adoption of a new rule of judicial procedure. Either way, the procedures governing certification would have to ensure that it
provides an efficient, fair, and useful method of resolving questions of intractable statutory ambiguity. The guidelines below outline a process by
which courts could stay cases and send questions to Congress without
transgressing constitutional boundaries or needlessly disrupting the judicial
and legislative functions.
Courts Authorized to Certify Questions to Congress.
Only the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals acting en
banc should be given the authority to abstain from deciding cases before
them and send questions about statutory meaning to Congress. They could
do so either sua sponte or in response to a motion by one or both of the parties, and only when a majority of their members voted to do so. If the process were abused or overused, then they could be required to act through a
supermajority of at least two-thirds, or the practice could be restricted to the
Supreme Court alone. The goal is to limit certification to those cases in
which congressional assistance would be most useful, and to prevent Congress from being inundated by such requests from the federal judiciary.12
12

Another possibility is for Congress to create a specialized judicial body to make decisions about
which statutory construction questions should be certified to Congress. For example, these decisions
could be made by an inter-circuit committee of chief judges, or by a smaller group of rotating judges
assigned to the task. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (2000) (establishing a rotating three-judge panel responsible for
appointing independent counsels). In a related context, Chief Justice Burger called for the creation of a

6
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Criteria Governing Certification to Congress.
In deciding whether to certify a question about statutory meaning to
Congress, these courts should rely on some of the same criteria they employ
when considering whether to grant petitions for review. At a minimum, the
case must raise a question about statutory meaning on which the Courts of
Appeals have differed, and that question should be important and likely to
recur.13 In addition, the statute involved must be either silent or internally
inconsistent on the issue, because it is in such cases that the traditional tools
of statutory interpretation provide no judicial guidance.
Ambiguous statutes raising constitutional questions are particularly
good candidates for certification because Congress is the more appropriate
institution to rewrite statutes to avoid the constitutional problems.14 Statutes
with minor, technical defects would also be worth bringing to Congress’s
attention through certification. Courts could not certify questions about the
meaning of criminal statutes, however, because constitutional limitations
such as the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses prohibit retroactive
alterations to criminal law.15 Nor should courts certify to Congress questions about statutory meaning that Congress has delegated to another institution. For example, courts should continue to give Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes rather than send questions
about those statutes to Congress.16
Judicial Communication of the Question to Congress.
If a court decides to certify a question about statutory meaning to Congress, it should send its request for congressional assistance to the Chairs
and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.17
The certifying court should identify the statute at issue and clearly state its
question about statutory meaning.18 In addition, the court should inform
Congress that it believes the statutory ambiguity would best be addressed
National Court of Appeals that would screen those cases that the Supreme Court would hear on review.
Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D.
573, 590 (1972). The proposal would have created a new court, consisting of seven appellate judges
who would decide which cases were worthy of Supreme Court review.
13
See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing grounds for granting a petition for writ of certiorari); FED. R.
APP. P. 35 (listing grounds for granting rehearing en banc).
14
See infra Parts IV–V for discussion about the kinds of cases for which certification would be
most useful.
15
See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
16
See infra notes 129–32.
17
Cf. Abdul-Malik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d 72, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that circuit courts
have disagreed over the meaning of federal sentencing statutes and directing the Clerk of the Court to
forward the opinion to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees).
18
See, e.g., MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:03 (stating that a certification order must state the question of
law to be answered and provide a statement of “all facts relevant to the question certified”).
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by Congress in the first instance, and consequently it is abstaining from deciding the case so that Congress will have an opportunity to resolve the issue by amending the statute. Finally, the court should inform Congress of
the date on which it will proceed with the case should Congress not respond.
Congressional Response to a Certified Question.
A court may not compel Congress to reply to its question about a statute’s meaning. If Congress chooses to respond, however, it must do so by
enacting a new piece of legislation amending the statute at issue in the
pending case, because courts will give little weight to post-enactment legislative history.19 Thus, as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, Congress is under no obligation to “clarify” the statutory ambiguity in
accordance with the enacting legislature’s intent, but rather may resolve the
ambiguity as it thinks best.
Length of Time that a Certifying Court Should Abstain While Awaiting
Congressional Response.
Certifying questions to Congress will inevitably delay resolution of the
case. To minimize this problem, courts should abstain only for as long as
reasonable to allow Congress to take action. If Congress wishes to respond
by amending the legislation, it must indicate a serious intent to do so within
six months—for example, by scheduling hearings on the issue, or drafting
legislation that is under active consideration. If Congress has not taken any
concrete steps to amend the statute within six months of receiving the certified question, the court should proceed with its own consideration of the
case. And even if Congress does take action to fix the legislative problem
within the six-month window, the court should not wait indefinitely for
Congress to enact the proposed legislation into law. If Congress has not
succeeded in enacting a legislative fix within two years of receiving the
court’s request, the court should lift its stay and hear and decide the case on
its own.20
Effect of a Congressional Response to a Certified Question.
If Congress amends the statute in response to a court’s certified question, the certifying court should presume that Congress intended that the
new legislation be applied to the pending case unless doing so would be so
unfair to one of the litigants as to raise due process concerns—a rare occurrence.21 The certifying court may either resolve the case in the first instance
19

See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (refusing to consider post-enactment legislative history).
20
See discussion infra V.B.
21
See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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or remand the case to a lower court with instructions to apply the new law
to the case.
II. THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY INDETERMINACY
To evaluate whether certifying questions to Congress is a useful
method of resolving statutory ambiguity, we must first understand why
Congress drafts ambiguous statutes and how courts currently deal with that
problem. Part II.A addresses the causes of statutory indeterminacy and the
interpretive methods courts employ in response. As any student of the law
knows, this is an area of extensive discussion among not just scholars, but
practitioners and judges as well. The summary below is not meant to be
comprehensive or to address the nuances of the problems of statutory drafting and interpretation—topics that could each take up an entire law review
article by themselves. Rather, my goal here is to outline a debate over how
to locate statutory meaning that has been richly explored in other sources. I
then turn to my proposal to send at least some of these hard cases of statutory construction back to Congress for consideration, which would provide
courts with a new tool to address statutory indeterminacy.
Part II.B then looks closely at three decisions from the Supreme
Court’s 2004 Term to observe these methods of interpretation at work, and
to illustrate how frequently they fail to locate meaning in truly ambiguous
legislative text.
A. The Judicial Response to Statutory Ambiguity
Statutes are ambiguous for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the rush to
enact a needed piece of legislation will result in sloppy or inconsistent language or even outright drafting errors.22 Sometimes Congress will rationally conclude that it is not worth its time to attempt to predict and address
every potential wrinkle in a statute’s implementation.23 And sometimes the
ambiguity arises from application of the law to a new or unusual circumstance that Congress could not have foreseen.24 Less benignly, Congress
22

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 83
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 418–22
(1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes].
23
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value
of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002).
24
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory Interpretation]; see also ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS 61 (1997) [hereinafter KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS] (discussing the
different reasons for statutory ambiguity). As Judge Posner wrote:
[The] basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not that they are
poorly drafted—though many are—and not that the legislators failed to agree on just what they
wanted to accomplish in the statute—though often they do fail—but that a statute necessarily is
drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered
in, its application.
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may choose to enact an ambiguous statute as a compromise to ensure the
statute’s passage; by being purposely vague, legislative drafters can generate sufficient support for a statute that would fail to become law were sensitive issues definitively resolved through clear and detailed statutory
language.25
Whatever the causes, courts have to deal with the problem of applying
unclear statutes. Interpreting ambiguous statutes has been the focus of an
extraordinary amount of academic discussion26 and judicial debate.27 Although “theories of statutory interpretation have blossomed like dandelions
in the spring,”28 two dominate the field: textualism and intentionalism.29 In
addition to general interpretive theories, most jurists also turn to various
canons of statutory construction to help them construe opaque statutes. Below is a thumbnail sketch of these approaches, followed by a summary of
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra, at 811.
25
See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2, 20–22 (1997) (“Some compromises . . . result in clear statutory language
purposely being made unclear.”); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994) (“It is
entirely possible—indeed, highly probable—that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue
. . . Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts.”); Victoria F. Nourse &
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575, 594 (2002) (noting that legislation often contains “deliberate ambiguity”).
26
See, e.g., Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note 5, at 2029; William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990);
Maggs, supra note 9, at 136 (“Modern legal scholarship has perhaps dealt with no single subject more
thoroughly than statutory interpretation.”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (“For as long as there have been statutes, lawyers
and laymen have puzzled over their inevitable ambiguities.”); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra
note 22.
27
Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“By far the greatest part of what I and
all federal judges do is to interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations. Thus
the subject of statutory interpretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of judges and (hence) lawyers.”).
28
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 1. For an overview of
schools of thought regarding statutory interpretation, see KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra
note 24, at 46–64 (discussing canons of statutory construction, public interest theory, public choice theory, positive political theory, textualist theory, and contextualism).
29
See supra note 4. A few scholars have noted that textualism and intentionalism are not as distinct
as they first appear because even textualists assume that the statute they are interpreting was enacted
with some purpose in mind. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348–49
(2005); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 826 (1994). For
an interesting interchange regarding the theories of textualism and intentionalism, see Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610, n.4 (1991). In Mortier, eight justices joined a footnote stating
that “[l]egislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should never employ them
in a good faith effort to discern legislative intent.” Id. The footnote was in response to a sole concurrence by Justice Scalia which, in addition to stating that it would be better “not to use committee reports
at all,” urged the Court “to give the text its fair meaning, whatever various committees might have had
to say—thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws, not of committee reports.”
Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the debate about their effectiveness in locating the meaning in an ambiguously worded text.
Finally, I include in this section a discussion of dynamic statutory interpretation, a relatively new approach which stands apart from these other
interpretive techniques. Although few jurists would claim to practice dynamic statutory interpretation, some scholars claim it is a descriptively accurate account of how judges deal with indeterminate statutes.30 Because
dynamic theory has some explanatory force, and because a certification
procedure addresses many of the criticisms of this theory, it is included in
this background section.
1. Textualism.—Textualism is an interpretive theory that seeks to
find meaning in the language of the statute as it would have been understood by an observer at the time of its passage.31 Textualists look only for
the objective understanding of the statute’s language, and thus do not try to
ascertain the intent of the enacting Congress.32 Indeed, textualists contend
that there is no such thing as congressional “intent” because a multimember
body such as Congress cannot have one unified understanding of the law
being enacted.33 Accordingly, textualists strictly limit the sources they rely
on to assist them in interpreting unclear statutory language: a contemporaneous dictionary definition of a statutory term is useful, but committee reports and floor statements are not.34 Textualism has gained prominence as
its leading proponents—Justices Scalia and Thomas on the Supreme Court,
and Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit—have risen in the ranks of
the federal judiciary.
Proponents consider textualism to be the theory of interpretation most
consistent with democratic values and the rule of law. As Justice Scalia has
explained, textualists focus on the language of the statute and the objective
understanding of that language because “it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by
what the lawgiver promulgated.”35 Government by unexpressed legislative
intent is “tyrannical” because it is the law that should govern, and not the
30

See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 9–106.
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
32
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 27, at 17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law. . . .”). But see Nelson, supra note 29, at 348–
49; Redish & Chung, supra note 29, at 826.
33
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 22, at 433.
34
To be fair, Judge Easterbrook has not entirely scuttled the use of legislative history. He has conceded, perhaps begrudgingly, that “[l]egislative history may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the
enactment and the assumptions its authors entertained about how their words would be understood.” In
re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989). After opening the door somewhat, he quickly closes
it—noting that “[t]he process is objective; the search is not for the contents of the authors’ heads but for
the rules of language they used.” Id.
35
Scalia, supra note 27, at 17.
31
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intent of the lawgiver.36 Furthermore, textualists view intentionalism as a
cover for judges to slip their own policy preferences into statutory interpretation.37 Judges should not enact legislators’ unexpressed intent into law,
but even more so judges should not enact their own policy preferences into
law.
Critics of textualism point out that it is a terribly thin method of gleaning statutory meaning, and they believe that textualists simply ignore the
fact that the statutory language alone does not always provide the answers.38
They contend that certain judges have “begun to use textualist methods of
construction that routinely allow them to attribute ‘plain meaning’ to statutory language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent.”39 Mirroring textualists’ critiques of intentionalism,
opponents charge that textualists insert their conservative policy preference
into statutes under cover of “plain language” analysis.40 In sum, textualism’s critics think it lacks the sophistication needed to find meaning in unclear statutes, and they dispute the textualists’ assertion that it provides a
neutral and value-free method of statutory interpretation.
2. Intentionalism.—Intentionalists construe statutes in an effort to realize the enacting legislatures’ intent.41 Accordingly, intentionalists will
rely on legislative history and floor debates, and they are willing to construe
statutory text in light of the legislature’s stated goals. Purposivists, who
practice a variation on intentionalism, go a step further and require that
judges interpret statutes in light of the spirit of the legislation, even if that
interpretation were not one that the enacting legislators would have predicted or embraced.42 Intentionalists and purposivists—just like textualists—also claim that their enterprise is consistent with democratic values
because they are enforcing the commands of elected representatives; it is
just that intentionalists and purposivists view courts as agents of the legislature, while textualists want courts to serve as agents of the statute itself.43

36

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 17–18.
38
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The Conflict Between
Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 656–57 (2005) (“[A] leading criticism of
textualism” is that “in too many situations, the statutory text just does not provide enough guidance.”).
39
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony
and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995).
40
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 77 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Foreword].
41
See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 22, at 428–29.
42
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–02 (1979) (engaging in a purposivist interpretation of Title VII); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 166–67, 1148–79 (tentative ed. 1958) (describing purposivism).
43
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 22, at 415.
37

12

101:1 (2007)

Certifying Questions to Congress

Intentionalism and purposivism, like textualism, cannot rid statutes of
all ambiguity. The legislature may not have anticipated every situation in
which the statute comes into play, and thus there will be no legislative purpose to guide the court in its application of the statute in unforeseen circumstances. And it does not always make sense to discuss the “intent” of a
multimember institution like a legislature, which may have many different
and sometimes conflicting purposes in mind when enacting a statute.44 As
public-choice theorists have pointed out, if the statute is a jumble of tradeoffs among interest groups, then it is impossible to extrapolate from some
nonexistent consensus about the statute’s end goals to fill gaps or reconcile
inconsistencies.45 In such cases, there is no “spirit” to be attributed to the
legislation, but rather a legislative middle ground in which each side got
some, but not all, of what it wanted. To interpret the law in light of some
greater purpose would then undermine the compromise that allowed the
legislation to be enacted into law in the first place.46 In short, critics contend that the very idea of a discoverable legislative intent or statutory spirit
is a chimera that often serves as a cover for judicial lawmaking.
3. Canons of Construction.—Another method of resolving statutory
ambiguity is to employ canons of construction that set default rules to assist
in interpretation. Some canons are valued simply as common-sense guides
to the reading of any text—for example, the canon that specific statutory
provisions qualify general ones or that words in a statute should not be rendered superfluous.47 Some canons incorporate presumptions about how the
legislative process works—for example, repeals by implication are disfavored, and appropriations statutes are presumed not to modify substantive
law.48 More generally, canons are valued as providing a set of default rules
against which Congress legislates, so that courts are simply applying the
same tools to interpret that Congress used in drafting.49 In addition to incorporating these values into the process of statutory construction, canons
are praised as a method of limiting judicial discretion because they require
judges to rely on something other than their own policy preferences when
interpreting unclear statutes.

44

Id. at 433.
Nelson, supra note 29, at 370–71.
46
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 22, at 427 (“The characterization of legislative purpose
is an act of creation rather than discovery.”).
47
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001); Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992).
48
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221–22 (1980).
49
Eskridge & Frickey, Foreword, supra note 40, at 67 (“The usefulness of the canons . . . does not
depend upon the Court’s choosing the ‘best’ canons for each proposition. Instead, the canons may be
understood as conventions, similar to driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as
important to choose the best convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it.”).
45
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Yet the claimed benefits of the canons of statutory construction have
been repeatedly challenged. As Professors William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey rather bluntly put it: “almost everybody thinks that canons are
bunk.”50 Judge Richard Posner has questioned the logic of many of the
canons and argued that they do not, in fact, embody common-sense interpretive rules.51 Some of the assumptions about how the legislative process
works are overly idealistic and inaccurate. As Posner noted, why should
repeals by implication be disfavored when there is no evidence that Congress “combs the United States Code for possible inconsistencies with the
new statute, and when it spots one, it repeals the inconsistency explicitly”?52
And why should words in a statute never be read to create a redundancy
when we know that Congress can be sloppy when drafting statutory language?53 Most vociferously refuted is the idea that canons prevent judges
from enacting their policy preferences. Professor Karl Llewellyn famously
demonstrated that for every canon one could find an opposing canon, allowing judges to justify any result by citing to some purportedly neutral canon
of statutory construction.54
The canon of constitutional avoidance has been the subject of particularly close scrutiny. The benefits of the canon are oft-cited by courts: It
enables the judiciary to resolve cases without having to expound on constitutional meaning or risk the direct conflict with Congress that would occur
were the court to strike down legislation as unconstitutional.55 Yet commentators have questioned judicial authority to construe statutes to avoid
potential constitutional issues—at least without first determining with certainty that the most straightforward reading of the statute would be constitutionally problematic. Critics contend that when courts skew the reading of
statutes to avoid considering hard constitutional questions, they are essentially making a legislative, not a judicial, choice.56
50

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 639
(1988).
51
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 805–06.
52
Id. at 812.
53
Id.
54
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521–35 (1960); Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 816 (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not constrain
judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the appearance that his decisions are constrained.”). But see Scalia, supra note 27, at 26–27 (contesting Llewellyn’s view that for each canon
there is an equally well-accepted opposing canon).
55
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936).
56
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2002) (criticizing the avoidance canon as “a roving commission to rewrite statutes to taste”); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CAL. L. REV. 397, 400–01 (2005) (noting that critics claim that the “avoidance canon produces a judicially rewritten statute without democratic legitimacy”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 98 (1995).
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4. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation.—Professor William Eskridge,
one of the leading proponents of dynamic theories of statutory interpretation, has argued that courts should, and in fact already do, construe statutes
“dynamically,” by which he means “in light of their present societal, political and legal context.”57 Eskridge has mustered evidence to show that
courts seem to take into account signals of current congressional preferences, perhaps to avoid a congressional override of a judicial decision about
statutory meaning that Congress does not like.58 Eskridge is joined by many
other commentators who advocate incorporating public opinion and current
social norms into statutory interpretation.59 Guido Calabresi has gone a step
further and called for courts to “update” statutes in the same ways that
courts adjust and amend the common law to take into account changing
times.60
Dynamic statutory interpretation theory also has its critics. Some argue that the judiciary does not have the institutional competence to determine current societal preferences because it lacks the ties to constituents
and the investigative capabilities that legislatures use to gauge public opinions.61 Furthermore, when judges update statutory meaning to accord with
current views of the public good, they blur the distinction between the legislative and judicial functions delineated in the Constitution. The very
vagueness of the task will lead judges to insert their own policy preferences
into the statutory text because they cannot locate public opinion.
Seeking to address these concerns, Professor Einer Elhauge has recently published a series of articles suggesting that when judges are faced
with statutory indeterminacy they should look to evidence of what the current Congress would do, rather than amorphous “societal preferences” on
which other dynamic theorists would have courts rely.62 Although Elhauge’s proposal has the benefit of narrowing the sources to which a court
can look to update statutes, there will likely be little or no evidence of what
a current legislature thinks of a statute enacted decades ago. If a court is
truly unable to determine current legislative preferences, Elhauge proposes
that the court adopt a construction of the statute designed to elicit a con-

57

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479
(1987).
58
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 336–41 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding].
59
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–54 (1986); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note
22, at 451.
60
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 81–90.
61
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31–36 (1938); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 60 (2003) (“Judges are relatively poorly
equipped to identify social problems or undertake their own factual investigations into those problems.”).
62
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note 5, at 2084.
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gressional response—his goal being to replace indeterminate statutory language with that approved by a majority of the current Congress.63
In turn, Elhauge’s proposal has been criticized by Professor Amanda
Tyler on the ground that it “erodes core separation of powers principles” by
asking judges to “divin[e]” current legislative preferences before they become law.64 She rejects his presumption that courts can issue opinions that
will provoke legislatures into enacting legislation to override them, and,
even if they could, pursuing this goal would be an evasion of judicial interpretive responsibilities and a usurpation of legislative power.65 This debate,
as Tyler recognizes, turns on one’s views regarding the role of the judge:
Tyler values judges as “guardians” of “continuity and predictability” in
statutory interpretation; she is concerned that dynamic theories of statutory
interpretation value the judge’s creative role too highly, and at the expense
of the judge’s role in providing legislative stability.66
B. The Limits of Interpretation
As many academics and some judges have openly admitted, no technique of interpretation can resolve every question of statutory ambiguity.67
Posner acknowledged the problem when he asked: “[W]hat if a judge’s
scrupulous search for the legislative will turns up nothing? There are of
course such cases, and they have to be decided some way.”68 Each term, the
Supreme Court grapples with questions about statutory meaning that have
divided the courts of appeals because there is no meaning that can be extracted from the legislative text or history. Such cases demonstrate the limits of traditional methods of statutory interpretation and, consequently, the
need to find alternative ways to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous statutes.
To illustrate the problem, three cases from the Supreme Court’s 2004–
2005 term are described below. Each presents what I believe is an intractable statutory construction problem that cannot be resolved by any interpretive technique. In addition, in none of the cases was there a clear societal or
congressional preference that could guide the Court. Yet in each case, the
majority and dissent both claimed to find meaning in the statute by employ63

Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting, supra note 9, at 2165.
Tyler, supra note 6, at 1392.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1389–90 (quoting ROBERT F. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 11 (1969)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
67
See, e.g., Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note 5, at 2029 (“Statutory interpretation involves two crucial issues. (1) How should courts divine the meaning of statutes? (2) How should courts
decide what to do when they cannot divine a statute’s meaning?”).
68
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 821. Posner advocates that in such cases the
judge can permissibly rely on considerations unrelated to legislative purpose, such as judicial administration or “considerations drawn from some broadly based conception of the public interest.” Id.
64
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ing textualism, intentionalism, a canon of statutory construction, or some
combination of the three.
1. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.—Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education69 raised the question whether the private right
of action in Title IX extends to retaliation claims. Title IX provides that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”70 The Court framed the issue as being whether “retaliation is
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’” and thus is a cause of action that can
be brought under Title IX.71 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
had dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that “[n]othing in the text
indicates any congressional concern with retaliation that might be visited on
those who complain of Title IX violations.”72 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits on that point.73
The Supreme Court was closely divided on the question, with the five
justices in the majority holding that the language of Title IX included retaliation claims and the four dissenters concluding that it did not. Although
the majority acknowledged that other civil rights statutes specifically refer
to retaliation claims, it determined that this omission from Title IX was insignificant in light of the fact that Title IX is broadly written: “Because
Congress did not list any specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX,” the majority reasoned, “its failure to mention one such practice does
not tell us anything about whether it intended that practice to be covered.”74
Further support for this interpretation came from Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc.,75 a Supreme Court case decided three years before Title IX was
enacted that held that a general prohibition on racial discrimination covered
retaliation against those seeking to protect the rights of people directly covered by the statute. The majority stated, “it is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan]
and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted in conforFurthermore, the majority concluded that
mity with [Sullivan].”76
“[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement
69

125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
71
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504.
72
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002).
73
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing to the conflicting decisions in Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ.
Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1997), and Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Community College,
31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)).
74
Id. at 1505.
75
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
76
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506 (quoting Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished.”77 Thus, the majority’s argument relied on all the traditional intentionalist methods of statutory construction—such as reliance on the
text’s broad language, the context of the statute’s enactment, and the statutory purpose—to conclude that Congress intended to cover retaliation.
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis, flatly declaring that
“the natural meaning of the phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ is on the basis of
the plaintiff’s sex, not the sex of some other person.”78 The dissent then relied on a number of equally well-accepted tools of statutory interpretation to
bolster its interpretation of the text. For example, the dissenters pointed to
canons of construction requiring Congress to speak clearly when imposing
liability on states through the spending power, and the presumption against
implying a cause of action when Congress has not made such a remedy
clear.79 Because these canons counseled against finding a cause of action
for retaliation, and because the dissenters found the text unclear at best, they
could not agree that Title IX allowed claims for retaliation.
In the final analysis, Jackson presented a question of statutory construction for which there was no clear answer. Whether a private cause of
action could be brought for retaliation divided the Supreme Court five to
four and the circuit courts two to one. Each side could muster arguments
based on theories of interpretation and canons of construction, but ultimately none could provide a satisfying response to the question whether the
statute allowed claims for retaliation.
Jackson was also a case with clear ideological battle lines: liberals favored the conclusion that there is a cause of action for retaliation, while
conservatives did not. Four of the five justices in the majority—Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens—are commonly perceived to be the liberal
members of the Court, while three of the four dissenters—Thomas, Scalia,
and Rehnquist—are considered the Court’s conservatives.
Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy played their usual role as swing voters, with
O’Connor’s decision to join the liberals giving them the majority. Unsurprisingly, it was criticized as an activist decision by liberal judges willing to
ignore statutory text in favor of their policy preferences.80
2. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.—The Supreme
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.81 addressed longstanding questions about the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the
statute giving federal courts supplemental jurisdiction. Specifically, the
77

Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 1514 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principles and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation,
84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 373 n.180 (2005) (describing Jackson as a decision that “mistakenly departs from
statutory text in order to achieve what the Court regarded as a desirable policy outcome”).
81
125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
78
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case raised the question whether federal courts can exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in diversity cases who seek to join the action
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 23 and whose claims
do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. The issue had created a deep circuit split: The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits held that § 1367 provides for such jurisdiction over additional
plaintiffs as long as one plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, while the First, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits concluded that
all plaintiffs had to meet the minimum. The Supreme Court had attempted
to resolve the question five years earlier, but had split 4–4 on the question.82
The Supreme Court was again closely divided on the issue, with five
justices holding that § 1367 provides for such jurisdiction and four concluding it does not. The majority began by describing the judicial precedents
that governed up until Congress’s enactment of § 1367 in 1990. Particularly relevant was the Court’s decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,83
establishing that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over class members’
claims that did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, and Finley
v. United States,84 which held that courts could not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional defendants in federal
question cases. All agreed that § 1367 overruled Finley by providing jurisdiction over related state-law claims against additional defendants in federal
question cases, but lower courts differed about whether it had also overruled the decision in Zahn.
In concluding that § 1367 did displace Zahn, the majority purported to
apply “[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction” that took into account the statute’s “context, structure, and related statutory provisions.”85
The majority quoted § 1367(a), which provides, in relevant part:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.86

The case turned on the question of whether a diversity case in which some
plaintiffs plead the amount in controversy and others do not is a “civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.”87 The majority
concluded that “the answer must be yes,” declaring that if a district court
has jurisdiction over any claim in the complaint, then it has “jurisdiction
82
83
84
85
86
87

Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
490 U.S. 545 (1989).
Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
Id. at 2620.
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over a ‘civil action’ within the meaning of § 1367(a).”88 The only question
left to be answered was whether below-the-threshold claims by plaintiffs
joined in the action under Rules 20 or 23 fall within § 1367(b), which
carves out exceptions to the jurisdiction granted in § 1367(a). Because
§ 1367(b) does not exclude claims by plaintiffs joined under those rules, the
majority held that the claims could be heard in federal court.
The majority’s decision was classically textualist. The majority’s
analysis was limited to the text of § 1367, for which it concluded there is
only one “plausible” reading.89 Because the majority found the language
unambiguous, it refused to be shaken from its position by contradictory
statements in the legislative history.90 In any event, the majority found the
legislative history to be “murky” and “contradictory,” and it viewed some
of the statements in committee reports as efforts to circumvent the legislative process.91
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority’s
suggestion that the statute is clear, commenting that § 1367’s “enigmatic
text”92 is “hardly a model of the careful drafter’s art.”93 Contrary to the majority, the dissenters concluded that a case in which some plaintiffs do not
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement is not a “civil action” over
which the district courts have “original jurisdiction.”94 In the dissenters’
view, a district court will have diversity jurisdiction over a civil action only
if each plaintiff satisfies the dual requirement that they be of diverse citizenship and bring claims satisfying the statutory minimum. Justices Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, but also wrote separately
to note that the legislative history supports the conclusion that § 1367 was
not intended to grant federal courts jurisdiction over plaintiffs whose claims
do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.95
In sum, the key issue in the case for both the majority and dissent was
whether district courts have original jurisdiction over a “civil action” raising claims by some plaintiffs below the amount-in-controversy threshold.
The text of the statute is silent on that point, the legislative history contains
some contradictory statements, and the context in which the statute was enacted fails to supply the answer. Although both the majority and dissent
88

Id. at 2620–21.
Id. at 2625.
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But the majority did observe that § 1367 withheld jurisdiction over plaintiffs joined as parties
“‘needed for just adjudication’” under Rule 19 even while allowing “supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule 20”—an “anomaly” that the majority suggested was the result
of an “‘unintentional drafting gap.’” Id. at 2624 (quoting from Meticare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 166 F.3d 214, 221 n.6 (1999)).
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Id. at 2626.
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Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 2628–31.
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purport to interpret the language of the statute, the fact that so many judges
have divided on the question suggests that it cannot be resolved by the text.
No technique of statutory interpretation can locate meaning in a statutory
provision that fails to address a question on which the entire case turns.
3. Clark v. Martinez.—Clark v. Martinez96 required the Court to address for a second time ambiguous wording in the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding detention of aliens ordered removed from the United
States. The statute at issue provided that “[a]n alien ordered removed . . .
may be detained beyond the removal period.”97 This provision applies to
several categories of aliens, including: (1) inadmissible aliens ordered removed; and (2) aliens who were originally admitted to the United States
and later ordered removed. The question in Zadvydas v. Davis,98 decided in
2001, was whether § 1231(a)(6) permitted indefinite detention of aliens in
the second category. The question before the Court in Clark concerned the
permissible length of detention for aliens who fell into the first category because they were never legally admitted to the United States.99
Zadvydas concerned two aliens admitted to the United States but then
subsequently ordered removed. No country would accept them, however,
and as a result the aliens were kept in detention by the government for years
with no reasonably foreseeable chance of being deported. The aliens argued that the statute did not permit their indefinite detention by immigration
authorities, while the government contended that it did because the text
“sets no limit on the length of time . . . that an alien . . . may be detained.”100
By a vote of five to four, the Court held that the statute did not permit indefinite detention but rather allowed detention “only as long as ‘reasonably
necessary’ to remove [an alien] from the country.”101
The Court explained that the statute’s use of the word “‘may’” in the
provision stating that aliens “‘may be detained beyond the removal period’”
“‘suggests discretion’” regarding the length of detention, but “‘not necessarily . . . unlimited discretion. In that respect, the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”102 Because the indefinite detention of aliens who had been admitted to
the country raised serious constitutional concerns, the Court interpreted the
statute to permit only detention necessary to accomplish removal; “once
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no
longer authorized . . . .”103 The Court further held that “the presumptive period during which the detention of an alien is reasonably necessary to effec96
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tuate his removal is six months; after that, the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is ‘no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”104 In sum, the Court concluded that the statutory language was unclear as to the amount of time
aliens could be detained, and it applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to limit that period.
The question in Clark v. Martinez was whether Zadvydas’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) also applies to the first category of aliens—that is,
those ordered removed who were never admitted to the United States. The
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had split on this issue.105 Seven Justices concluded that they must give the provision the same meaning as they did in
Zadvydas. The two dissenters, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
argued that the presumptive six-month limit imposed by the Court in Zadvydas rested largely on an interpretation of the language required by the
canon of constitutional doubt—a canon that was not applicable in the case
of an alien who had never been legally admitted to the United States and
whose detention could thus not implicate the same pressing constitutional
questions.106 The majority responded that this reasoning “cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning when [a different
category of] aliens are involved.”107 The ambiguous statutory language,
coupled with the constitutional concerns raised by its application to at least
one category of aliens, led the Court to impose a presumptive six-month
limit onto the detention provision.
Zadvydas and Clark are classic constitutional avoidance cases. The
statutory language was not perfectly clear, and the result of one reading was
constitutionally suspect, so the Court applied the canon to avoid addressing
whether the Constitution would permit indefinite detention of an alien. Applying that canon further required that the Court invent an amount of time
that the aliens could be detained. The Court concluded that six months was
a reasonable period, after which the government had to either demonstrate a
foreseeable chance of removal or release the aliens. As is obvious from
reading the statute and the opinions, that six-month period was entirely the
creation of a Court struggling to avoid striking down an ambiguous statute
as unconstitutional.
4. Conclusion.—The three cases discussed above all involved questions about the meaning of unclear statutes that divided the circuit courts
and the Supreme Court justices. As these cases illustrate, no theory of interpretation or canon of construction can help courts resolve truly inscruta104

Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 722 (quoting Zadyvdas 533 U.S. at 701).
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ble statutes. By accident or by design, Congress left unresolved whether
Title IX creates a cause of action for retaliation, whether federal courts have
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims below the amount in controversy requirement, and the length of time that aliens can be detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Absent congressional assistance, courts have no choice but to plow
ahead and do their best to resolve cases in a principled manner. In some of
these cases, however, the courts might be wiser to abstain from searching
for meaning where there plainly is none, and instead ask Congress to step in
and amend ambiguous or poorly written text. Considering that Congress
created the problem, and that Congress is capable of undoing any judicial
decision about the meaning of statutory text, it follows that Congress is the
institution best-situated to resolve disagreements about the meaning of statutes. Just as important, the judiciary will have gained even if Congress
does not respond to its query. If the language of a statute is unclear, and if
Congress chooses not to assist a court after being requested to do so, then a
court is empowered by that congressional silence to make law to replace the
ambiguous text before it.108
III. THE JUDICIAL TRADITION OF SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
As illustrated in Jackson, Exxon Mobil, and Clark, judges continue to
use the techniques of statutory interpretation described in Part II.A. However, these techniques are criticized as providing cover for judicial overreaching, and none can locate the meaning of truly ambiguous statutes.
This Article proposes that courts consider an alternative method of dealing
with at least some types of statutory ambiguity: Courts should have the option of referring questions about statutory meaning to Congress, much the
same way courts now certify questions about the meaning of ambiguous
state law to state courts.
As described in Part I, when a court concludes that a statute it is asked
to address is unclear, it could choose to stay the case, refer the problem to
Congress, and await a response that would apply to the pending case. If
Congress does not respond within a reasonable period of time, the court
could then decide the case with newfound freedom because Congress’s inaction signals the implicit delegation of its power to fill gaps and reconcile
inconsistencies in statutory text. Hypothetically, had certification been
available in the 2004–2005 term, the Court could have granted certiorari in
Jackson, Exxon Mobil, and Clark, and then referred its questions about the
meaning of the statutes in those three cases to Congress. If Congress had
not taken up the question, the Court could have decided the cases on its
own; if Congress responded by amending the statute at issue to eliminate
108
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the ambiguity, the Court could then remand the case and allow the lower
court to apply the amended statute in the first instance.109
Although a few scholars have briefly raised the possibility of certifying
questions to Congress, there has been no detailed discussion in the academic literature about whether such a process would be constitutional or
useful to the courts.110 Several prominent judges have supported the different, but not entirely unrelated, idea of establishing committees that would
focus on identifying problem legislation and proposing legislative solutions.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo recommended the creation of a Ministry of Justice composed of law professors, judges, and practitioners to perform that
task.111 Judge Henry Friendly revived Cardozo’s idea in 1963, though he
thought the committee should be located in the legislative rather than the
executive branch.112 Further elaborating on these proposals, then-Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested the creation of a “second look at laws”
congressional committee that would engage in “statutory housekeeping” by
fixing grammatical problems and ambiguous language identified by
courts.113 None of these proposals was ever acted upon, however, most
likely because they required adding a layer of bureaucracy to an already
over-burdened system. Moreover, these committee-based proposals address
problems only after a court has been forced to issue a decision regarding the
meaning of the statute—setting in stone an interpretation that may be difficult for Congress to undo. Nor would these committees give Congress the
same incentive to take action as a court’s request for clarification during a
pending case.
Permitting courts to certify questions to Congress thus has significant
advantages over a roving committee, but it raises separation of powers concerns that the committee-based solutions avoid. Part IV analyzes the ways
in which a certification process must be structured to avoid overstepping
constitutional boundaries. Part V addresses how and when certification
should be used: that is, which courts should have the power to certify questions to Congress, which type of questions they should refer, and how they
should deal with a congressional response (or non-response). Before delving into the nuts and bolts of how certifying questions to Congress would
work in practice, however, this Part describes how the federal courts have
109

The proposal discussed here is limited to federal courts and Congress. Conceivably, federal
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long accepted, and even welcomed, the involvement of other institutions in
decisionmaking. In light of this history, certification to Congress can be
understood as an extension of current practice rather than as a radical new
concept.
A. Drawing on the Tradition of Certification to State Courts
The idea of certifying questions to Congress might at first seem
anomalous. Courts are supposed to decide the questions that come before
them, not abstain and await a decision on the matter from another branch of
government. And yet the concept has a preexisting analogue in the certification and abstention procedures regularly used by federal courts to obtain
state-court clarification of state law. Although certifying questions to state
courts is relatively new, “the use of certification is on the rise.”114 For the
most part, federal and state courts, as well as state legislatures, have embraced the practice for reasons that should make certifying questions to
Congress similarly attractive to federal judges and Congress.
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,115 the Supreme Court
first established that federal courts should abstain from deciding the meaning of ambiguous state laws that raise federal constitutional concerns, and
should instead issue a stay and order the parties to litigate the state law issues in state court.116 Only after the state court system establishes the meaning of state law will the case return to the federal court for resolution of the
federal question, if necessary.117 Because abstention often resulted in significant delays, most of the states have now established streamlined certification procedures that allow a federal court to retain jurisdiction of a case
while sending a question about the meaning of state law directly to the state
supreme court.118 After the state supreme court decides the issue, the case
returns to the federal court for a final decision on the question of federal
law, which typically delays resolution of a case for no more than six
months.119
Certifying questions to Congress would follow the same basic form as
certification to a state court: the federal court would stay the case, retain jurisdiction, inform Congress of the question of statutory interpretation at is114

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
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sue, and then await a congressional response that the court will use to resolve the case. The federal court could lift the stay and decide the case if
Congress did not appear inclined to respond.
Many of the rationales for using abstention and certification to resolve
questions about the meaning of state law also support certifying questions
of federal law to Congress. Sending questions to state courts is justified on
the ground that state judges are better situated to resolve state-law issues:
state judges are more familiar with state law and state interests and they
carry the legitimacy to construe and apply state law that comes from having
been selected through the state political process.120 Leaving hard questions
about the meaning of state law to state courts also makes practical sense;
state courts retain the last word on any state law matter, and thus a federal
judge’s interpretation of state law might be immediately reversed by a statecourt pronouncement.
The same can be said of Congress and its role in establishing the meaning of federal law. As discussed in greater detail in Part V, Congress, not
the courts, is the proper institution to fill gaps in legislation and to clarify
intractable ambiguities or inconsistencies in statutory language.121 These
are essentially acts of lawmaking, not law construction or implementation,
and thus are best performed by the policy-making legislative branch. There
is no debate that Congress, not the judiciary, is the institution best-suited to
write laws in the first instance; Congress has the relationship with constituents, access to information, and accountability to the general public that
make it better qualified to engage in lawmaking.122 Considering their relative institutional competencies, Congress, not courts, should take the lead in
supplying statutory meaning when litigation reveals that a piece of legislation leaves some significant question unanswered. Like state courts, Congress is also the institution with the last word on statutory meaning;
Congress can, and often does, override judicial construction of federal statutes.123 Accordingly, when federal courts supply meaning for unclear statutes, they risk having wasted time and effort if Congress immediately
overrides the judicial decision through a legislative amendment.
Certification to state courts is also justified as a means by which federal courts can avoid making pronouncements about the constitutionality of
legislation.124 A state court may construe state law to sidestep a constitutional problem that a federal court might otherwise have to address and resolve. Certification to Congress can serve the same purpose. If Congress
receives a question about statutory meaning from a federal court, and it
120
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learns that the court is concerned that the statute may be unconstitutional,
Congress can alter the statutory language to steer clear of the constitutional
conflict.
The analogy is not exact, however. Abstention and certification procedures in the context of questions about state law are intended to promote
principles of federalism and comity—goals that judicial referrals to Congress obviously do not share. State sovereignty is highly valued in our federal system, and certification and abstention permit states to maintain some
control over interpretation and administration of their own laws. Not incidentally, many of the cases in which abstention was first established concerned sensitive state policies (such as the question of race discrimination in
Pullman125) and issues concerning state governance (such as the state’s eminent domain powers in Louisiana Power and Light Co v. City of Thibodaux126). Allowing state courts to decide these types of questions
demonstrates respect for state judicial systems and avoids the friction that
might result from a federal court decision on a delicate question of state
law.
But even though comity and federalism are not at stake when a federal
court refers a question to Congress, such referrals do promote similar goals
by demonstrating judicial deference to, and respect for, a co-equal branch of
government. Ideally, Congress and the courts would work together to make
laws clear and easily administrable. When a court seeks Congress’s input
before construing ambiguous statutes, it is both notifying Congress of problems in statutory drafting and providing Congress with the opportunity to
take the lead in clarifying the legislation. Just as federal courts’ deference
to states reduces friction between state and federal systems, similar deference to Congress may serve to limit the occasions on which courts and
Congress come into conflict over the meaning of a statutory text. Easing
tensions between Congress and courts, always important, is particularly vital at a time when the two branches are clashing on a regular basis.127
Despite these parallels between certification to Congress and to state
courts, sending a statute to another court for its interpretation is admittedly
different from sending it back to the legislature with a request that the language be rewritten. The analogy is useful, however, if only to show that
courts have accepted, and even embraced, a procedure that allows them to
delegate the task of statutory construction to an outside entity, suggesting
125
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that certifying questions to Congress is not so foreign to current federal
court practice as it might first appear.
B. Delegating Questions of Statutory Interpretation to Federal Agencies
Courts regularly rely on federal agencies to assist in the interpretation
of ambiguous federal laws. Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense
Council and its progeny have established that courts should defer to a reasonable agency construction of an ambiguous statute if that interpretation
was generated through a rulemaking proceeding carrying the force of law.128
Although Chevron asserted that Congress had delegated the interpretive authority to agencies by enacting statutes that agencies are responsible for
administering, it was the Supreme Court itself that declared that reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes should trump reasonable judicial interpretations.
Chevron demonstrates that courts are comfortable giving the lead in
statutory “clarification” to another institution. Courts limit agency authority by deferring only when a statute is truly ambiguous, the agency’s reading is reasonable, and the agency has acted through a deliberative process to
produce a rule carrying the force of law.129 Courts have nonetheless given
away a significant aspect of what had formerly been viewed as the judiciary’s sole power “to say what the law is.”130 Moreover, the rationale for doing so is that agencies are institutionally better suited to fill gaps and
resolve ambiguities in their governing statutes because they have more expertise and greater political accountability than courts—a rationale that
similarly supports giving Congress the first opportunity to resolve intractable statutory ambiguity when there is no agency interpretation to assist the
court.
C. Congress’s Longstanding Practice of Amending Unclear Legislation in
Pending Cases
Certifying questions to Congress would formalize a long tradition of
cooperation between the two branches. Even though no certification process is currently in place, Congress nonetheless amends legislation at issue in
pending cases, often after becoming aware of judicial confusion about the
meaning of statutory language.131 Throughout their history, the federal
128
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courts have accepted, and at times eagerly embraced, congressional assistance in statutory interpretation. United States v. Schooner Peggy132 established early on that courts must apply current law to pending cases even
when Congress amends the law after the case was brought, and even when
Congress’s express purpose is to affect the results in that case.133 In at least
two cases the Supreme Court deferred issuing a decision to give Congress
more time to consider a proposed amendment that would moot the case,
thereby actively helping Congress to resolve the question before the Court
was forced to address it.134
Legislative involvement in pending cases is thus a longstanding aspect
of legislative-judicial interactions.135 Because this practice is relevant to the
feasibility, desirability, and constitutionality of a formal process of certifying questions to Congress, it is investigated in some detail here. First, this
section reviews the data on congressional efforts to amend statutes that have
caused judicial confusion. Although Congress does not always enact legislative fixes into law, these efforts demonstrate that Congress will attempt to
clarify statutory language when it sees courts struggling with a statute’s application. Second, this section examines the Supreme Court’s reaction to
Congress’s efforts to amend confusing statutory language to assist it with a
pending case.
1. Congressional Efforts to Amend Unclear Statutory Language.—A
pair of scholars, Stefanie Lindquist and David Yalof, studied the frequency
with which Congress reacted to circuit court conflict over statutory language by passing legislation to resolve the question, thereby obviating Supreme Court review.136 They discovered that between 1990 and 1998,
Congress “sought to amend existing statutes or to pass new legislation to
resolve at least 19 instances of conflict among the circuits.”137 Lindquist
and Yalof conclude from this data that “Congress adopts some role in ensuring that its statutes are applied uniformly throughout the country, al132
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though Congress is not nearly as active as the Supreme Court in this
area.”138
Lindquist and Yalof note that Congress is more likely to get involved
in resolving intercircuit splits when the Supreme Court appears unwilling to
resolve the conflict.139 However, because Congress may not be able to react
to a circuit conflict with sufficient speed to address the issue before the Supreme Court does, congressional silence does not necessarily suggest a desire to let the Supreme Court resolve the issue in the first instance. At the
very least, the fact that Congress takes an interest in reacting to circuit
splits, even though it does not always manage to enact legislation to resolve
them, suggests that Congress is willing to play a role in clarifying unclear
statutes.
2.

Judicial Reaction to Congressional Interference in Pending
Cases.—Congress frequently affects the results in pending cases
when it amends legislation. Courts have developed doctrines to deal with
this recurring situation—for example, courts generally hold that an amendment to a relevant statute will moot a pending case that turns on the nowaltered provision.140 On occasion, courts have actively assisted Congress in
its efforts to moot pending cases by staying a case to await passage of a proposed bill. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant a writ of certiorari may turn on whether it appears that the statute at issue will be amended
in the near future.
As is evident from the cases discussed below, judicial reaction to congressional interference in pending cases is generally positive. Courts appear to welcome Congressional assistance in resolving disputes over
statutory meaning, and express concern about Congressional interference
only when it appears that Congress is legislating to control the outcome of a
specific case rather than to clarify the law generally.
a. Hayburn’s Case.—Hayburn’s Case,141 which concerns Revolutionary War veteran William Hayburn’s efforts to obtain a pension for his
military service, has become a constitutional chestnut; it is one of the oldest
cases still regularly cited by courts. Yet the Supreme Court never actually
issued an opinion on the merits, choosing instead to postpone a decision in
the hope that Congress would amend the legislation at issue, as Congress
ultimately did. The case is a classic example of judicial effort to avoid a
confrontation with Congress—especially important at this early stage in the
nation’s history when the federal courts had not yet established their authority to strike down acts of Congress as unconstitutional.
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Hayburn had claimed eligibility for a federal pension under the Invalid
Pension Act of 1792. The Act required injured veterans of the Revolutionary War to petition the judges of the United States Circuit Courts, who were
to determine whether the petitioner qualified for a pension. The judges
were then to submit the name and a recommendation for the amount of the
pension to the Secretary of War, who would review the evidence and could
reverse the court’s conclusion about whether the petitioner qualified for a
pension.142
Hayburn petitioned the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania for his pension. The panel of judges refused to hear his case
and instead wrote to President Washington to explain that they believed the
Pension Act was invalid because it provided that the executive branch could
reverse a decision of the judicial branch. The court explained that “[s]uch
revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts . . . .”143 In August
1792, Attorney General Edmund Randolph asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the federal circuit court in Pennsylvania
to act on Hayburn’s petition. The Court did not issue a decision on the merits, however, but instead agreed to hold the motion under advisement until
the next term—apparently concerned about offending Congress by declaring the law unconstitutional.144 As two legal historians explain, “[t]he justices clearly hoped that Congress would change the Invalid Pension law
before the Court actually issued an opinion on the mandamus motion.”145
Congress did just that. A few days before the Court’s next term ended,
Congress passed “An Act to regulate Claims to Invalid Pensions” that
amended the procedures to be followed by petitioning veterans and eliminated the constitutional problems.146 The Supreme Court never issued a decision on the merits of the case, apparently viewing the amended law as
mooting the issue and requiring Hayburn to follow the amended procedure
in order to receive his pension.
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Hayburn’s Case is an early example of the Court’s willingness to avoid
issuing a decision while awaiting congressional legislation that would obviate the need to address the constitutionality of a piece of legislation. It also
demonstrates Congress’s ability to amend statutes that are raising problems
for courts in pending cases. As described further below, Congress and the
Court have continued to work together to resolve issues in statutes without
either branch expressing concern that the other has overstepped its constitutional bounds.
b. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly.—
Sholly provides a more recent example of a case in which the
Court purposely postponed a decision while awaiting an amendment to the
legislation at issue in the case. Respondents opposed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s determination that the Atomic Energy Act permitted it
to approve an amendment to the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor’s operating license without a hearing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals had agreed
with Respondents that the Commission lacked the authority to do so. The
Commission sought review in the Supreme Court, and at the same time
proposed to Congress legislation authorizing the Commission to amend a
license without a hearing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May
26, 1981,147 but twice postponed oral argument to give Congress the opportunity to consider the legislation.148 Finally, in January of 1983, Congress
enacted the Commission’s proposed legislation, and the Supreme Court remanded the case so that the lower court could consider whether it was now
moot.149
Sholly demonstrates the benefits of judicial-legislative cooperation to
resolve a dispute over unclear legislation. The Court must have believed
that the issue would be better addressed by Congress in the first instance,
which is why it postponed issuing a decision to await forthcoming legislation. Indeed, had the Supreme Court gone ahead and decided the case in
favor of respondents, and had Congress then amended the legislation
shortly thereafter, the entire judicial process would have been an unnecessary waste. With the new legislation in place, the Commission would have
been free to amend the license without a hearing, just as it had attempted to
do earlier. Of course, if the Supreme Court had decided the case in favor of
the Commission, then the legislation would have been unnecessary. But the
Court (and possibly also Congress) appears to have believed that it would
be better for this determination to be made through a clear legislative directive rather than a judicial construction of an ambiguous statutory provision.
c. Additional recent cases.—In a number of other cases, Congress amended legislation after the Supreme Court granted certiorari but be147
148
149
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fore it issued a ruling. The legislative history reveals that Congress was
aware that the Supreme Court was on the verge of deciding a case regarding
statutory meaning and sought to resolve the issue before the Court did.
Department of the Treasury v. Galioto150 concerned an equal protection
challenge to a statute prohibiting firearms sales to anyone adjudicated a
mental defective or committed to a mental institution, but permitting such
sales to convicted felons. The lower court struck down the statute after
concluding that there was no rational basis for the distinction.151 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the appeal on November 4,
1985,152 and the case was argued on March 26, 1986.153 Meanwhile, Congress redrafted the legislation so that felons and the mentally ill were treated
alike, and the House Report accompanying the legislation noted that this
amendment should resolve the issue in the pending Supreme Court case.154
In its subsequent opinion a month later, the Court commented that this “enactment significantly alters the posture of this case,” and concluded that the
case was now moot.155
Department of Justice v. Provenzano156 questioned whether the Privacy
Act of 1974 qualified as an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act
and thus permitted withholding information from the public. The Third and
Seventh Circuits had issued conflicting decisions, and on April 2, 1984, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.157 On October 15, 1984, the President signed into law an amendment
to the Privacy Act stating: “No agency shall rely on an exemption in this
section to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under [the Freedom of Information Act].”158 The
House Report commented on the pending Supreme Court case and stated
that “[w]hatever ambiguity exists will be removed by this change in the
Privacy Act.”159 The parties agreed that this amendment mooted their dis150
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pute, and the cases were remanded for final resolution under the new legal
standard.
United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Commission160 concerned the
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1304, a federal statute that prohibited radio stations from broadcasting information about lotteries. Jersey Cape, a radio
station, had sued for declaratory relief arguing that § 1304 should not apply
to the broadcast of a winning number in a lawful state-run lottery such as
the one conducted in New Jersey. The Third Circuit reversed the Federal
Communications Commission and ruled that § 1304 did not prohibit broadcast of lawful state lottery results.161 This decision conflicted with an earlier
Second Circuit ruling, leading to the Supreme Court’s decision to review
the case.
After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress, aware of the Supreme Court case, passed a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1307, which stated that
“[t]he provisions of section . . . 1304 shall not apply to an advertisement,
list of prizes, or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority of State law.”162 The Court noted the change in the law
and remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the case
was moot.163
3. Conclusion.—These cases demonstrate that Congress has the institutional capacity to resolve statutory ambiguity after the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari but before the Court has an opportunity to rule on the
question. Just as interesting, the Court appears to welcome Congress’s efforts to moot pending cases by clarifying the legislation at issue. As
Information Act] . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 98-726(II), at 13 (1984). The Report reviewed the Third, Fifth,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuit decisions, and concluded by noting that the “circuit courts [are] evenly divided on this question” and that “the Supreme Court has agreed to decide the issue.” Id. at 14 & n.23.
Turning to the amendment, the Committee explained that it “specifically rejects the interpretation set
forth in the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.” Id. The Report continued:
While this Committee has no doubt about the true intent of the law, some have found sufficient
ambiguity in both the law and its history to fuel the current disagreement. Whatever ambiguity exists will be removed by this change in the Privacy Act.
Id.
160
420 U.S. 371 (1975).
161
Id. at 373 (citing N.J. Lottery Comm’n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974)).
162
Appended to the House Report describing the amendment was a letter from the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). The FCC commented on the litigation and its own difficulty construing 18 U.S.C. § 1304, and it noted the conflicting Second and Third Circuit decisions. H.R. REP.
NO. 93-1517, at 19 (1974). The FCC also informed the Committee that the Department of Justice had
petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Id. at n.3. Presumably, then, Congress was aware of the pending Supreme Court case when it chose to amend the statute to rid it of any ambiguity on this point.
163
Interestingly, Justice Douglas dissented from the per curiam opinion. He thought the statute,
prior to amendment, clearly violated the First Amendment, and argued that Congress had overstepped its
bounds by seeking to moot the dispute. He analogized the legislation to an unconstitutional bill of attainder and stated that “[f]or Congress to hold that the radio station in the present case was or was not
guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1304 would be a flagrant usurpation of Art. III powers.” N.J. State Lottery Comm’n, 420 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Lindquist and Yalof’s study reveals, Congress also takes notice of judicial
confusion in the lower courts and seeks to resolve such conflicts by clarifying legislation. Congress may step in because it wants to assist courts in
applying unclear statutes, or, more likely, because it wants to wrest control
of statutory meaning from the judiciary. Whatever its reasons, Congress is
already responding to judicial confusion through amendments that affect results in pending cases, albeit in an inconsistent and ad hoc fashion. In light
of this practice, we should establish a more structured and formalized process by which courts may refer hard questions about statutory meaning to
Congress.
Admittedly, however, there is a darker side to this legislative practice
of amending legislation to affect results in pending cases. During some of
the most unstable periods of American history, Congress has passed legislation seeking to ensure that it would obtain the judicial outcomes it desired.
In Ex parte McCardle,164 for example, Congress enacted legislation stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear McCardle’s habeas corpus
petition just a few days after the case was argued in the Supreme Court.
McCardle was challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Military
Reconstruction Act—a challenge that Congress had reason to think the
Court might decide in McCardle’s favor—and so Congress sought to prevent the Court from hearing and deciding the issue.165 The Court agreed it
no longer had jurisdiction over the case as a result of the legislation.166
The Court did not permit Congress to control the results in United
States v. Klein,167 a case from the same post-Civil War period in which
Congress sought to prevent the Court from awarding compensation for the
Union’s seizure of property during that war. Congress was unhappy with
the Court’s previous decisions granting compensation, so it enacted legislation attempting to force the Court to reach a different result in Klein’s case.
This time, the Court refused to defer to Congress, although the constitutional grounds for its refusal to do so have remained unclear.168
The legislation enacted on the eve of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
McCardle and Klein was not intended to clarify statutory ambiguity or
eliminate constitutional problems in legislation, but instead sought to strip
the Court of power to decide these cases in ways that Congress did not like.
164

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
FALLON, HART & WECHSLER’S, supra note 114, at 328.
166
McCardle, 74 U.S. at 515.
167
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
168
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 437, 437–38 (2006) (“[United States v. Klein] is a case whose importance to the shaping
of American political theory has never been fully grasped or articulated by scholars, and whose meaning
has been comprehended by the federal judiciary—including the Supreme Court itself—virtually not at
all.”). For a more detailed discussion of the facts of Klein, the Court’s holding, and limits on Congress’s
power to control results in pending cases, see infra notes 200–09 and accompanying text.
165
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These attempts by Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of the judiciary can be distinguished from cases such as Hayburn’s Case or Sholly in
which Congress enacted legislation intended to assist courts with statutory
construction. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Congress’s
power to alter the results in pending cases gives Congress the ability both to
aid courts and to undermine their authority. Any certification procedure
must take into account the troubling possibility that Congress might misuse
an enhanced ability to affect pending cases.
IV. STRUCTURING CERTIFICATION TO SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRAINTS ON THE ROLES OF COURTS AND CONGRESS
Before discussing the normative implications of encouraging courts to
certify questions about statutory meaning to Congress, the first question to
be answered is whether such a practice would be constitutionally permissible. Judicial referrals to Congress raise significant separation of powers
concerns. The formalist view of separation of powers requires that each
branch perform its assigned tasks with rigid independence from the others.169 Functionalist theories are more flexible, conceding that the branches
may engage in activities outside of their narrow, constitutionally assigned
tasks, but only so long as they do not diminish the constitutional stature of
another branch by taking over its essential functions.170 Under either view,
a process by which courts stay cases and refer specific questions about
those cases to Congress for resolution comes dangerously close to impermissibly mixing the legislative and judicial functions.171 The discussion below seeks to show that judicial referrals to Congress are constitutional as
long as referrals are structured so that neither the court nor the legislature
crosses boundaries that delineate the judicial from the legislative power.
From the very beginning of the Union, courts have concluded that they
are compelled to apply the law as it exists at the time of the decision, even
if that law has recently been altered by Congress.172 Accordingly, even
169

See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1524 (1991).
170
See id. at 1527. Professor Brown goes on to describe “the scholarly debate about separated
powers” as “polarized, for the most part, between the formalists and the functionalists—a battle between
those who would pay the price of rigidity in order to achieve an elusive determinacy on the one hand,
and those who would pay the price of indeterminacy in order to achieve unguided flexibility on the
other.” Id. at 1530.
171
As the Supreme Court stated when striking down the legislative veto, “even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this
subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
172
U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (“[I]f subsequent to the judgment
and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which
governs, the law must be obeyed.”); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)
(“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”).
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without any formal certification system in place, it is clear that Congress
may amend legislation to resolve a dispute pending before a court—indeed,
as just discussed, Congress has often done so.173 This long tradition demonstrates that legislation intended to resolve pending court cases is not, per se,
unconstitutional. The only question, then, is whether a formal certification
process under which courts encourage Congress to pass such legislation
transforms a constitutionally permissible practice into an impermissible
one. This Article concludes that certifying questions to Congress does have
constitutional implications that must be addressed in the structure of the
certification process. As long as these limits are in place, however, judicial
referrals to Congress do not transgress constitutional boundaries. Below is
a description of the constitutional concerns raised by certification of questions from courts to Congress, and then a discussion of the ways in which
the process can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters.
A. Judicial Communication with Congress
A certification process would allow judges to communicate with the
legislative branch about pending cases. Communication between the judiciary and the other branches of government is not by itself unusual or suspect; indeed, it happens all the time.174 Federal judges frequently appear
before Congress to answer questions about their work and discuss the need
for funding, staff, and other resources. And judges regularly communicate
with the executive branch during litigation. The Supreme Court will seek
the Solicitor General’s views on the merits of petitions for writs of certiorari, and federal judges are required by statute to inform the U.S. Attorney
General or the relevant state attorney general whenever they are asked to
decide a case challenging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress or a
state statute. Courts must “certify such fact” to the requisite executive officer and then must allow the executive to intervene and participate as a party
in the case.175 Permitting judges similarly to communicate with Congress
during pending cases would therefore not appear to present any particular
constitutional problem.
Constitutional questions would arise, however, were Congress to require judicial consultation during pending cases, because then Congress
would come dangerously close to inserting itself into the judicial process
and taking over the judicial power to decide “cases” and “controversies.”
173

See supra notes 131–63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 279, 279 (1991) (“History suggests that dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of
government was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution.”).
175
28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000); see, e.g., Merill v. Town of Addison, 763 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1985)
(certification to state attorney general that action had been filed in federal court challenging the constitutionality of state statute is “duty of court that should not be ignored, even if the claim is obviously frivolous or may be disposed of on other grounds”).
174
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Accordingly, the impetus for referrals must come from the courts, not Congress. Likewise, judges cannot order Congress to respond to their questions
about statutory meaning. A recognized attribute of the legislative power is
the “exercise [of] discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed”;176 consequently, courts cannot dictate the legislative agenda by
demanding Congress clarify statutes in response to judicial questions.
A formal procedure of certifying questions to Congress need not go so
far, however. To ensure its constitutionality, both branches must take part
only if and when they choose to do so. This flexibility would be essential
to ensuring the procedure did not improperly intrude into either branch’s
constitutionally-assigned realm.
B. The Form of Congress’s Response
If Congress did choose to respond to a judicial inquiry into the meaning of an ambiguous statute, what form must that response take? INS v.
Chadha177 makes clear that Congress can “clarify” statutory meaning only
in accordance with the bicameral passage and presidential presentment requirements of Article I. As the Supreme Court declared in Chadha,
“[t]hese provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design
for the separation of powers” and cannot be compromised.178 In short, Congress must enact a new law if it wishes to clarify the meaning of an existing
one.
Of course, individual members of Congress would be free to issue
statements proclaiming their own understanding of the meaning of the
statutory language at issue in a pending case. And Congress as a whole
could pass a non-binding resolution on the question. But a court can give
such statements no more weight than it gives to any other post-enactment
legislative history—that is, virtually none at all.179 Unless Congress actually
amends the law at issue, the court has received no congressional guidance
as to the meaning of the statute and should go ahead and decide the case on
its own.
In essence, then, a judicial referral is not seeking the current Congress’s interpretation of a previously enacted statute, but instead is enlisting
the current Congress’s help by asking it to revise a poorly drafted statute.
Congress is not bound to clarify the statute to accord with what it thinks the
enacting Congress would have wanted. Just as Congress is always free to
change laws by amendment, the Congress that receives a judicial referral
may choose to radically alter, rather than to clarify, the statute at issue.
176

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
178
Id. at 946.
179
See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (“[S]ubsequent
legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.”) (internal citation
and quotation omitted).
177
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Some might argue that this process gives the current legislature too
much control over the meaning of legislation, and does so at the expense of
the wishes of the enacting legislature. Although Congress always has the
power to amend legislation, Congress is busy and has limited resources, and
so more often than not would leave even problematic legislation in place.
But if Congress is notified by the courts of a legislative ambiguity and then
given a limited window of time in which to fix the problem so as to affect
the results in pending cases, Congress is more likely to take action. The influence of the enacting Congress will be diminished, while the Congress in
power at the time of a judicial decision will have a greater say in the meaning of the legislation.
One response to this concern is that the enacting legislature retains all
of its power over the meaning of its legislation as long as it speaks clearly
in the first instance. It is only when the enacting legislature passes unclear
statutes that courts could certify questions to be resolved by the current
Congress. Moreover, even without a certification procedure in place, an
enacting legislature risks frustration of its purpose when it fails to speak
clearly in a statutory text—the only difference being that it is judges with
cases before them, rather than the current Congress, who determine the
statute’s meaning. Furthermore, although most judges purport to resolve
statutory ambiguity with reference to the enacting legislature’s preferences,
legal scholars have observed that judges frequently interpret statutes in light
of current political preferences—perhaps out of a desire to avoid congressional overrides, or perhaps because judges are not as insulated from political pressures as their lifetime appointments might suggest.180 And maybe
this is for the best. Professor Elhauge has suggested that each legislature
would prefer that courts apply statutes in accord with the current legislature’s preferences rather than those of the enacting legislature, reasoning
that “[a]s a general matter, political preferences for a given statutory result
are likely to be stronger in the present because those who hold those preferences (and elect the government) are those who experience that result.”181
As Elhauge notes, the political preferences of those very same politicians
(and electors) might have changed by the time the statute is being construed
years in the future, and thus the enacting legislature might not even wish a
court to interpret its legislative acts as it would have originally intended.182
Elhauge’s critics question how courts are to “divine” current legislative
preferences. As Professor Amanda Tyler noted in her critique, “sources for
ascertaining such [legislative] preferences are limited and we deal by definition with an area in which the current legislature has not acted (at least not
in any formal way).”183 More often than not, the current Congress will not
180
181
182
183

ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 75.
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note 5, at 2039.
Id.
Tyler, supra note 6, at 1407.
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have given the legislative question before a court any thought at all. Do we
really think that members of Congress spend their time pondering the complexities of supplemental jurisdiction, for example? If Congress has not
even thought about the issue—as will often be the case when courts address
minor technical questions about a statute’s application—then there will
simply be no legislative preference for courts to discover.184 Tyler is also
concerned about the merging of legislative and judicial functions that would
likely occur were courts seriously to attempt to “track[] current political
maneuvering” and monitor the “ebbs and flows of the legislative process”
in an effort to guess Congress’s preferences regarding a statute’s interpretation.185 She cites these problems as serious flaws in Elhauge’s proposal.
Certifying questions to Congress avoids these issues by requiring the
current legislature to enact its preferences if it wishes to assist courts in applying ambiguous statutes. Courts will not be second-guessing Congress
based on the statements in committee reports attached to bills that never become law, as Elhauge suggests, but will instead be applying statutory text
directly addressing the problem in the case at hand. At the same time, certification realizes Elhauge’s primary goal of incorporating the current legislature’s preferences into the meaning of unclear statutes. It does so by
alerting Congress to the problem and giving Congress time (through abstention) and an incentive (in the form of a pending case in which the meaning
of the statute must be resolved) to take action.
C. The Substance of Congress’s Response
The fact that Congress may pass an amendment that changes the meaning of a law, rather than merely clarifies an ambiguity, raises a more troubling concern: Congress may use the referral process to control the
outcome in a specific case, arguably usurping the judicial power to resolve
cases and controversies.186
1. Separation of Powers Concerns.—The constitutional structure that
separates judging from legislating impliedly forbids this type of legislation.
As Chief Justice John Marshall declared: “It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules . . . would seem to be the duty of other departments.”187 Moreover, specific constitutional provisions, such as the Bill of
Attainder,188 Equal Protection,189 Due Process,190 and Ex Post Facto191
184

Id.
Id. at 1408.
186
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961–62 (Powell, J., concurring); J. Richard Doidge,
Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States
v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 941–42 (1994).
187
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
188
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
189
Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
185
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Clauses all seek to protect individuals from this type of targeted legislation.
In The Federalist No. 47, Madison explained that under the U.S. Constitution the “Legislature can perform no judiciary act,” and he quoted Montesquieu’s declaration that “‘[w]ere the power of judging joined with the
Legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control . . . .’”192 In sum, as Professor Martin Redish put it, “Congress may
not, through legislation, dictate the resolution of an individual litigation.”193
At least three separation of powers values are implicated by legislation
targeting specific cases. First, dividing judging from legislating protects the
litigants by ensuring that laws are applied by politically-insulated judges
through safeguards that accompany the judicial process, such as notice and
an opportunity to be heard.194 When Congress enacts legislation affecting
large categories of the population, it has incentives to draft laws that are just
and reasonable; conversely, when its laws single out only a very narrow
category of people or cases, Congress is unrestrained by political pressures
and, of course, need not adhere to the structures of adjudication. To the
contrary, the pressures to please the majority may push Congress to target
individuals for disfavored treatment. As Justice Powell observed: “Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are
subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting majority.’”195
A second, and related, concern is that Congress can often avoid being
held accountable for legislation favoring individuals and small groups. Although retroactive legislation is often feared because of its potential to target individuals for punishment, it can just as easily be used to provide
190

Id. amend. IV, § 1.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
192
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 268–69 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
193
Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46
MERCER L. REV. 697, 718 (1995); see also Doidge, supra note 186, at 941 (“Intuitively, the legislature’s
ability to manipulate the results of pending litigation undermines the ideal of ordered liberty and the protections against tyranny for which divided government strives.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 168, at
445 (“The resolution of individual cases—including the process of the application of general law in factspecific contexts—clearly falls within the concept of ‘judicial’ power, as a definitional matter. Thus,
Congress may not constitutionally adjudicate individual disputes, because to do so would constitute the
performance of a nonlegislative function, in violation of Article I’s vestiture in Congress of nothing
more than the ‘legislative power.’ If Congress may not itself resolve individual litigations, its direction
to the courts as to how to resolve specific disputes is constitutionally problematic.”) (internal footnotes
omitted).
194
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are present
when a court or agency adjudicates individual rights.”) (internal footnote omitted).
195
Id. (Powell, J., concurring). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
998 (1978) (The legislature may not “‘pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus [] escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.” (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949))).
191
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benefits to the influential.196 For example, Congress has a history of inserting last-minute riders in appropriations bills that command the outcome in a
specific case “notwithstanding” the statutes governing that area of law.197
These case-specific amendments to legislation enable Congress to target individuals for special treatment without taking the political heat that would
accompany passage of a law enacted after hearings and a committee vote.198
Third, by enacting case-specific legislation, Congress usurps the judiciary’s power. The Framers were generally concerned that one branch of
government might seek to aggrandize its own power at the expense of the
others, and in particular worried that the legislature—whose “powers [are]
at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits”—would encroach on the functions of the other two branches.199 When Congress legislates to control the outcome of the particular case, it appears to be doing just
that.
Despite these constitutional concerns, there is no clear precedent forbidding Congress from legislating to control the outcome in individual
cases. Strands of reasoning from the few cases to address this problem do
strongly suggest, however, that Congress is walking on constitutional thin
ice when it passes legislation targeting specific pending cases. In addition,
various constitutional provisions prohibit Congress from singling out individuals for legislative penalties.
2.

Caselaw Addressing Limits on Congress’s Power to Control the
Outcome in Individual Cases.—The Court’s decision in United
States v. Klein200 came close to establishing that Congress cannot enact legislation to control the results in specific cases. The case arose from the
turmoil of the post-Civil War period. Klein, administrator of the estate of
V.F. Wilson, sued the United States in the Court of Claims pursuant to the
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863. That Act permitted the owner of property seized during the Civil War to receive compensation for the loss of property “on proof to the satisfaction of [the Court of
Claims] . . . that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion . . . .”201 President Lincoln had proclaimed that “certain persons who
had been engaged in the rebellion” would be pardoned and have their prop196

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 248–49 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (expressing this
concern); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 267 n.20 (1994).
197
Nagle, supra note 1, at 1283–84.
198
In its amicus curiae brief in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, Public Citizen listed a number
of examples of such case-specific riders, which it said exemplified the type of legislative overreaching
that the Court should strike down as an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial branch. Brief of
Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503
U.S. 429 (1992) (No. 90-1596).
199
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 275 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
200
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
201
Id. at 131 (internal quotations omitted).
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erty restored to them upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Union; Wilson
had taken this oath.202 The Court of Claims ruled that Wilson’s pardon entitled his estate to compensation under the statute, and the government then
appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.203
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court heard an appeal in Padelford v.
United States204 concerning a similarly-situated claimant. The Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Claims that the presidential pardon entitled
Padelford to the proceeds of his property. In response, Congress enacted a
law providing that: (1) a Presidential pardon would not be admissible evidence in favor of a claimant seeking compensation under the Abandoned
and Captured Property Act; (2) the Supreme Court was to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction any appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in which
the claimant established his loyalty through a pardon; and (3) the Court of
Claims was to consider evidence that the claimant had received a pardon as
“conclusive evidence that such person did take part in, and give aid and
comfort to, the late rebellion,” and to dismiss any lawsuit on a claimant’s
behalf for lack of jurisdiction.205
In a wide-ranging opinion, the Court struck down the new law. The
Court articulated several grounds for its holding, and so it is impossible to
know which, if any, would have been decisive alone. Most relevant here is
the strand of the Court’s opinion establishing that Congress cannot “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in
cases pending before it.”206 By stripping the Court of jurisdiction over any
case in which a pardon was granted, and ordering that a pardon be considered evidence supporting a conclusion contrary to the one the Court had
previously reached, Congress was seeking to control the outcome of a pending case and thus had “passed the limit which separates the legislative from
the judicial power.”207 In a recent discussion of Klein’s holding, the Court
again emphasized that a key problem with the legislation was Congress’s
attempt to lay down rules to control the outcome of a case currently before
the Supreme Court (and, not incidentally, to obtain an outcome in the government’s favor).208
Although Klein declares that there are constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to legislate so as to control results in individual cases, the
opinion was muddled, and came at a particularly tense moment in congressional-judicial relations. Its conclusion has rarely been revisited. It is thus
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Id. at 131–32.
Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1869).
76 U.S. (9 Wall) 531 (1869).
Klein, 80 U.S. at 134.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980).
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only shaky precedent to support the conclusion that Congress is not permitted to enact legislation seeking to control the outcome in a pending case.209
The Supreme Court again set limits on Congress’s power to change results in specific cases in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms.210 Congress had enacted legislation extending the limitations period for certain securities
actions. The Court held that the legislation violated separation of powers
by purporting to reopen final judgments to permit previously dismissed
cases to be re-filed under the new limitations period.211 Thus, Plaut established that Congress’s power to affect the results in pending cases does not
extend so far as to permit it to undo the results in cases that have been finally resolved by the judicial branch.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society212 provides the most recent
guidepost in this area.213 Environmental groups and companies in the tim209

In a recent article, Redish and his co-author, Christopher Pudelski, argue that the constitutional
problem in Klein was not a Congressional attempt to control the outcome in a specific case, but rather
“legislative deception” arising from Congress’s efforts to achieve the results it wants through jurisdiction stripping. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 168, at 438–439. As these scholars point out, the legislation at issue in Klein appears to apply to all cases involving pardons issued to former Confederate
sympathizers seeking compensation for their property, and not just Klein’s case. Id. at 445.
210
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
211
Id. at 240.
212
503 U.S. 429 (1992).
213
The most recent and well-known example of targeted legislation was inspired by the case of
Theresa Marie Schiavo, a brain-damaged Florida woman. Schiavo had been in a vegetative state for
thirteen years when a Florida state judge found that Schiavo would not have wanted to continue living in
such a state and ordered that her nutrition and hydration be discontinued. See In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000). Schiavo’s parents were strongly opposed to the order, which they believed reflected the wishes of Schiavo’s husband
but not Schiavo herself.
The U.S. Congress responded to the state court order by passing an Act, signed into law at approximately 1:00 A.M. on March 21, 2005, entitled, “An Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo.” Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). The law was explicitly limited in application to
Schiavo. It ordered the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to “hear determine, and render judgment” on any claim of “alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo
under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of foods,
fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain life.” Id. The law gave standing only to Schiavo’s parents to bring such a suit, and permitted the district court to give relief “to protect the rights of Theresa
Marie Schiavo” alone. Id. Anticipating barriers to a federal lawsuit, the Act required that the district
court review all claims “de novo,” that it not abstain in favor of state court proceedings, and that it not
await exhaustion of state law remedies. Id. To limit its effect to Schiavo, Congress declared that the
new law “shall not be construed to create substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution
and the law of the United States or of the several States” and did not “constitute a precedent with respect
to future legislation.” Id.
Schiavo’s parents immediately filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order. Most
of the federal judges asked to address the motion simply assumed the constitutionality of the legislation
and denied the motion on other grounds. One exception was Judge Birch, of the U.S Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, who concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc to declare that the law violated separation of powers because Congress “arrogat[ed] vital judicial functions to itself.” Schiavo ex
rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005). Although he focused his arguments on
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ber industry had challenged the government’s regulation of harvesting and
sale of timber in old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest, which were
home to the endangered northern spotted owl. The environmental groups
argued that the regulation was too lax, the timber industry that it was too restrictive. In response to the litigation, Congress enacted the Northwest
Timber Compromise, which established new requirements for the Forest
Service’s management of the forests at issue—requirements that (supposedly) represented a compromise position between the demands of the environmental groups and the loggers.214 The law then provided that
compliance with these new statutory requirements would be considered
“adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases,” and cited the names and
docket numbers of both cases.215 Loggers argued that the new law mooted
the pending cases, while environmental groups challenged it on separation
of powers grounds.
The Ninth Circuit was troubled by the law’s specificity, and particularly its attempt to control the outcome of the explicitly-referenced pending
cases. Citing Klein, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Northwest Timber
Compromise crossed the constitutional line between legislation and adjudication. According to the Ninth Circuit, the “critical distinction” is “between
the actual repeal or amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which
is permissible, and the actual direction of a particular decision in a case,
without repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation, which is
not permissible.”216 Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had
done the latter, it invalidated the law.217
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s description of the effect of the Northwest Timber Compromise, finding that Congress had
changed the underlying legal standard.218 The Supreme Court thus had no
occasion to address the correctness of the “critical distinction” that the
Ninth Circuit drew from Klein. Although that ultimate question was postponed, the decision demonstrates that Congress can enact legislation limited
the law’s alteration of the standard of review and abrogation of the rules of exhaustion and abstention,
his real concern seemed to be that Congress changed the rules for a single individual. He concluded by
stating, “because the Act applies to only this case it lacks the generality and prospectivity of legislation
that comports with the basic tenets of the separation of powers.” Id.
Judges Tjoflat and Wilson dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. The dissenters argued that
Congress had the constitutional power to change the standard of review and other procedural rules:
“Congress has prescribed a particular approach to a particular problem in the general domain of federal
jurisdiction, without presuming to dictate—in any respect—our performance of a court’s essential function: ‘to say what the law is.’” Id. at 1281.
214
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101121, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989).
215
Id. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
216
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990).
217
Id. at 1317.
218
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
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to explicitly-identified pending cases and yet the Court will conclude that it
did not cross the line into exclusive judicial territory.219
Also left unresolved was the issue raised in the case by Public Citizen,
a nonprofit public interest group acting as amicus curiae. Public Citizen
contended that even if the law did change underlying legal standards, it
might still be unconstitutional “if the change [in law] swept no more
broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the
pending cases.”220 That is, Public Citizen argued that Congress overstepped
its bounds when it enacted legislation targeting a few cases, even if that legislation purports to change underlying legal standards. The Supreme Court
specifically noted this objection in its opinion, but did not address it on the
ground that it had not been raised below.221
The unanswered Public Citizen objection in Robertson goes to the
heart of constitutional concerns raised by the process of certifying questions
to Congress. Normally, the legislature enacts general rules that affect large
classes of the population, while courts apply those general rules to individual cases.222 If Congress responds to a judicial referral by seeking to control
the outcome in a pending case, it might well cross the constitutional line
that separates legislating from judging, as well as violate constitutional
principles intended to prevent the abuses that can occur when legislation
targets individuals. Klein and its progeny address the separation of powers
concerns and suggest that there are constitutional limits on Congress’s
power to legislate for specific cases, but leave the exact parameters of Congress’s authority unclear.
Under the law as it stands today, Congress has the ability to enact laws
targeting pending cases, and courts have the obligation to review those laws
to determine whether Congress has strayed too far into judicial territory.
Permitting courts to refer questions to Congress admittedly provides more
opportunities for Congress to misuse its power, but it does not change any
fundamental aspect of the legislative process to give Congress more leeway
to do so. If Congress were to respond to certified questions by seeking to
control the outcome of specific pending cases rather than to amend the legislation generally, the Supreme Court could revisit the parameters of Congress’s power to do so and perhaps more clearly define those limits for
Congress and the lower courts.
3. Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Targeted Legislation.—In
addition to the general restrictions on Congress dictated by separation of
219

See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 168, at 457 (criticizing the Court for leaving this an open
question).
220
Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441 (citing amicus brief of Public Citizen).
221
Id.
222
William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers,
and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055,
1089 (1999).
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powers principles, specific constitutional provisions such as the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Equal Protection Clauses prohibit Congress
from singling out individuals for disfavored treatment in a pending case.223
These provisions serve as an additional bulwark against targeted legislation,
and they provide another source of authority under which courts can strike
down such legislation. Because their application is narrow, however, they
would likely have only a minimal role in policing congressional responses
to judicial referrals.
a. Bill of Attainder Clause.—The Constitution specifically prohibits Congress and the states from passing a bill of attainder,224 defined as
“a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial.”225 This provision, along with the Ex Post Facto Clause, serves to protect individuals from the misuse of legislative power and is often cited in
support of the separation of powers principle that Congress should not stand
as judge in individual cases.226 As the Supreme Court declared in United
States v. Brown, “the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended . . . as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by
legislature.”227
The Supreme Court has interpreted these prohibitions narrowly, however. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,228 the Court addressed
223

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 242 (1995) (noting that “the Constitution’s ‘separation-of-powers’ principles reflect, in part, the Framers’ ‘concern that a legislature should not be able
unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person’” and that this principle was expressed
“both in ‘specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,’ and in the Constitution’s ‘general
allocation of power’” (citations omitted)).
224
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
225
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
226
As Justice Stevens declared in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.:
Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern future conduct.
The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of
private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped
to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably
would have existed had no wrong been committed.
488 U.S. 469, 513–14 (1989).
227
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). The criticality of separating the legislative and the judicial functions
also did not escape the Framers. As Madison noted in The Federalist No. 57, a central protection
against legislative tyranny was the fact
that [the House of Representatives] can make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been
deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people
together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of
which few governments have furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 316 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
228
433 U.S. 425.
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former President Nixon’s bill of attainder challenge to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. Although the Act applied only to
Nixon, establishing special burdens that only he had to bear, the Court upheld it because “the mere specificity of law does not call into play the Bill
of Attainder Clause.”229 The special circumstances of the storage of
Nixon’s presidential papers justified Congress’s creation of a “legitimate
class of one,” and so the Act’s singling out of Nixon for special treatment
was not a violation of the Clause. Moreover, even if the Act’s specificity
had triggered the Bill of Attainder Clause’s application, the Court concluded that Congress had not “inflicted punishment” on Nixon simply by
burdening him with obligations under the Act.230
The Court contrasted the Act at issue in Nixon with the one struck
down in United States v. Lovett, where a House Report expressly characterized the named individuals as “subversive . . . and. . . unfit . . . to continue
in Government employment.”231 Although a formal legislative condemnation of specific people is not a prerequisite to finding a law an unconstitutional bill of attainder, there must be some evidence of legislative intent to
penalize the individual affected. The Court concluded that such evidence of
legislative malice went to the heart of the Constitution’s bill of attainder
prohibition, which arose from “the fear that the legislature, in seeking to
pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to
assume the mantle of judge—or, worse still, lynch mob.”232
As Nixon and Lovett demonstrate, only in fairly extreme circumstances
will laws be struck down as unconstitutional bills of attainder. Even legislation that imposes special burdens on named individuals will not be invalidated unless there is evidence of a clear congressional intent to judge and
punish. Accordingly, even though the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as
some measure of protection against targeted legislation, it applies only in
fairly extreme cases of congressional malice toward an identified few.
b. Ex Post Facto Clause.—The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits
Congress from enacting laws that retroactively impose punishment by
changing the criminal legal consequences of completed acts.233 “Critical to
relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is . . . the lack of fair notice and government restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what
was prescribed when the crime was consummated.”234 Like the Bill of Attainder Clause, it applies only to laws that penalize, and prevents legisla-
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Id. at 471 n.33.
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tures from criminalizing previously innocent acts.235 Retroactive changes to
procedures at criminal trials, or to civil penalties, are not violations of this
limitation on Congress’s power to legislate. So, for example, the Court held
that the Clause did not bar a state from passing legislation civilly committing sex offenders who had completed their prison sentences.236
c. The Equal Protection Clause.—The Equal Protection Clause
also prohibits Congress from targeting individuals for disfavored treatment.
A legislative classification will be upheld as long as it is supported by some
rational basis, but that basis cannot include an animus toward one person, or
even a small group of individuals. As the Supreme Court declared, “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”237 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause serves as a slightly broader
textual prohibition against legislation singling out specific individuals or
groups for special treatment.238
d. Conclusion.—The trio of constitutional provisions discussed
above seeks to protect individuals from becoming the targets of legislative
penalties. But their scope is narrow. Clearly, they prohibit Congress from
passing legislation that retroactively criminalizes previously innocent conduct, but otherwise they are decisive only in the most extreme cases of legislative animus. Perhaps they are most useful for the way in which they
support and establish the vague ideas discussed but not resolved in Klein—
whatever it is Congress is allowed to do, it must legislate broadly enough to
avoid the charge that it has sought to punish a specific few.
These limits provide some parameters that courts can use to police
Congress’s response to a certified question. If Congress seeks to control the
results in the pending case rather than clarify the law for all current and future litigants, courts can disregard the legislation as either a violation of one
of these specific constitutional provisions, or more generally as an overstepping of legislative authority and an impermissible intrusion into the judicial power to decide specific cases.
D. Limits on Retroactive Legislation
If courts were permitted to certify questions to Congress, they would
have to grapple with the extent to which a congressional response to a certified question would be applied retroactively to pending cases. One of the
235
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theories underlying the proposal is that Congress is more likely to respond
to a judicial inquiry about statutory meaning when it knows it can change
the result in all pending cases. Sometimes, this might require that Congress’s legislation be given retroactive effect.
The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, together with the Due
Process Clause, suggest that there are constitutional limits on the retroactive
effect of legislation.239 “Retroactivity is not favored in the law,” and thus
the default rule is that “congressional enactments and administrative rules
will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”240
The presumption against retroactivity is in tension, however, with the
rule established in Schooner Peggy that a court is to apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision.241 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,242
the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile these potentially conflicting doctrines. Landgraf reaffirmed that congressional intent is the touchstone. If
Congress makes clear it wants legislation to be applied retroactively, then
the Court is required to apply the law to pending cases, save in a few rare
circumstances when to do so would violate an individual’s constitutional
rights.243 If the statute contains no express statement about its application,
then the court must determine whether the statute has retroactive effect—
that is, “whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect
to transactions already completed.”244 Determining whether a law operates
retroactively is often a difficult question, and it requires that judges decide
whether there was fair notice, reliance on old law, or disruption of settled
expectations.245 If the law does have retroactive effect, then it should not be
applied to pending cases, but all other new legislation should—even in
cases that have been adjudicated in the lower courts under the old legal
standards.
Ideally Congress would respond to a certified question by clearly
specifying if it wishes the clarifying legislation to be applied retroactively.
Certified questions from courts create an unusual situation, however, in
which a court is asking Congress to clarify an existing law to assist the
court in deciding a pending case. Accordingly, Congress has reason to presume that its response will be applied retroactively.
239
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That was the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court in
Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court.246 Shortly after that court
had granted review, the California Legislature passed legislation for the explicit purpose of “clarify[ing] the law” at issue in the case and overturning
the court of appeal’s decision.247 The California Supreme Court then had to
determine whether the new legislation constituted a “substantial change in
existing law,” and, if so, whether the Legislature intended the statute to operate retroactively.248 That court concluded that the legislature’s statement
that it intends an amendment to “clarify” an existing law is equivalent to a
statement that it intends the amendment to be given retroactive effect.249
Arguably, every law explicitly enacted to “clarify” existing law should
be applied retroactively, whether or not the court thinks it accurate to describe the amendment as a clarification. Likewise, when a court stays a
case and seeks congressional clarification of ambiguous legislation, it
would be reasonable to presume that Congress intends its response to apply
to that case and other pending cases—that is, to have retroactive effect.250
In rare cases, constitutional limits will require that the court disregard
even an explicit instruction by Congress to apply a law retroactively. Retroactive legislation may violate due process “if it is particularly harsh and
oppressive,”251 and legislation that purports to free the government from
previous contractual commitments is particularly suspect.252 But the Due
Process Clause forecloses retroactive legislation only in the most extreme
cases, for as the Court explained in Landgraf, “the constitutional impediments to retroactive legislation are now modest.”253 There are few constitutional hurdles, then, to incorporating Congress’s response to a certified
question into the resolution of pending cases.
Furthermore, it would be difficult for congressional clarification of an
ambiguous statute to disrupt settled expectations so as to implicate due
process or even to raise the fairness concerns that troubled the Court in
Landgraf. If a statute is so unclear that numerous courts have disagreed as
to its meaning and there truly is no way to determine what the original
Congress intended, then individuals had no reason to rely on one particular
246
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interpretation of the statute over another. Could the plaintiffs in Exxon Mobil have been counting on the availability of supplemental jurisdiction when
the statute itself was so muddled on that point? Could the school board in
Jackson have assumed that it could retaliate against the basketball coach
without fear that it would violate Title IX, despite the conflicting precedent
on that question? It is hard to imagine any individual relying on an understanding of the law that neither the text nor legal precedent clearly supports.
In short, if the law is unclear enough to justify certifying a question to Congress, it cannot have created the kind of reliance interests that the presumption against retroactivity seeks to protect.
E. Judicial Authority to Abstain
To give Congress a chance to respond, a court certifying a question
about the meaning of an ambiguous statute to Congress would need to stay
the case in which the question arose for some set period of time—perhaps
for no more than six months, with the possibility for extension if Congress
appears to be on the verge of taking action. This judicial abstention might
be challenged on the ground that courts have no constitutional authority to
forgo the exercise of their jurisdiction. Federal courts are obligated to resolve the cases or controversies over which Congress grants them jurisdiction; they are not supposed to evade that task by asking some other
government institution to resolve cases for them. Professor Martin Redish
made that point in his article challenging the judicial practice of abstaining
from deciding difficult questions of state law to allow state courts to resolve
the issue first.254 He argued that courts may not evade their obligation to assume jurisdiction and decide cases simply because, in their view, federalism
and comity concerns make remand to state courts the wiser course of action.
Yet despite the strength of this criticism, courts continued to abstain under
the Pullman and Younger line of cases—even when it means depriving litigants of the federal forum that Congress intended to provide.255
Certifying questions to Congress is no more an evasion of the judicial
obligation to hear and decide cases than abstaining to allow state court resolution of questions of state law, and thus no more constitutionally objectionable. By staying its hand, the court is postponing, but not abdicating,
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the delay caused by certification to Congress would be considerably shorter than the average six-year
delay in cases remanded to state courts for resolution, and would be more
254
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akin to that involved in certifying questions to state supreme courts.256 A
six-month to two-year delay seems like a small price to pay to definitively
resolve a troubling issue of statutory interpretation. And, of course, if Congress itself were to enact a law permitting courts to send it questions in
pending cases, then there could be no complaint that the court’s staying of
the litigation was in any way an evasion of its congressionally mandated jurisdiction.
F. Conclusion
The discussion in this Part demonstrates that certifying questions to
Congress raises significant separation of powers concerns and could impinge on individual rights protected by other constitutional provisions. Yet
the discussion also reveals that these problems occur only at the margins,
and that the Constitution does not prohibit all judicial attempts to seek congressional input on pending cases. Accordingly, certification must be structured to comply with constitutional limitations. The guidelines below
provide general principles for a certification process that take into account
these problems and seek to insulate it from constitutional challenge:
(1) Referrals must be discretionary: Courts must never be required to
refer cases, and Congress must never be required to respond.
(2) To be given any legal weight, Congress’s response must be in the
form of legislation enacted in accordance with Article I’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.
(3) Congress must respond through broadly applicable legislation,
rather than by enacting a statute that seeks to control the result in
only a handful of cases.
(4) Courts should not certify questions about the meaning of criminal
statutes. It is in the area of criminal penalties that constitutional
limitations such as the Ex Post Facto Clause, Bill of Attainder
Clause, and Due Process Clause provide the clearest, and most
needed, limits on Congressional power to legislate for pending
cases.
(5) Congress should specify whether it wants the amended legislation
to apply retroactively to pending cases, although courts would
probably be safe to assume that Congress intended any response to
a referral to be applied retroactively.
(6) Congress should pass, and the President should sign, a law permitting courts to certify questions to Congress so that when a court re-
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fers a case all three branches of government will have given the
procedure their imprimatur.
If a certification process followed these broad principles, it should pass
constitutional muster. Whether adopting such a procedure would be a good
policy choice is a harder question to answer, however. Satisfying constitutional minimums is a necessary prerequisite to adopting a certification procedure, but is certainly not sufficient reason on its own to establish a formal
structure through which courts ask Congress to weigh in on pending cases.
Moreover, even if certification can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters, it comes close to certain constitutional lines that we might think
better to give wide berth. Part V examines these normative questions and
draws conclusions about the kinds of cases in which certification would be
a useful tool for courts, and those for which the delays and the potential for
abuse of the legislative process would outweigh the benefits.
V. CERTIFYING QUESTIONS TO CONGRESS: A POLICY ANALYSIS
The constitutional analysis in Part IV suggests that certification is less
radical than it might first appear. Yet is it wise? A formal system by which
courts seek congressional input would give courts and Congress an opportunity to communicate about the cases in which legislative assistance would
be most useful. But when courts stay cases and notify Congress that they
are seeking clarifying legislation, they push Congress to take a more active,
and possibly troubling, role in pending cases. If we are concerned that
Congress may act irresponsibly when faced with an unpopular litigant, or
that Congress may not enact its best legislation in the shadow of the facts of
specific cases, then we may question whether Congress should be given this
opportunity. Alternatively, judicial certification to Congress could be criticized as entirely unnecessary. Considering that Congress already has the
power to amend legislation at issue in pending cases, what would a formal
certification process accomplish?
This Part first discusses in greater detail the policy arguments for and
against establishing a procedure by which courts send questions to Congress, using the three recent Supreme Court cases discussed in Part II—
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah
Services, and Clark v. Martinez—to illustrate the possibilities and pitfalls of
sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress. This Part then addresses the very real possibility that Congress would often not respond to a
court’s request for clarification of legislative meaning. Congressional silence need not be viewed as a failure of the certification process, however,
because Congress’s refusal to clarify legislation can be understood as an
implicit delegation to courts of the lawmaking authority that they otherwise
lack. If courts ask for Congress’s input and receive no answer, they can
then legitimately engage in lawmaking that they should otherwise avoid.
Indeed, this is one way in which certification changes the relationship be54
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tween courts and Congress; although today Congress has the authority to
amend legislation under judicial review, its failure to do so does not carry
with it the delegation of lawmaking authority that is implied when Congress
fails to respond to a certified question. This Part concludes by identifying
the types of hard cases in which judicial referrals would assist judges grappling with the meaning of ambiguous statutes.
A. The Benefits of Certifying Questions to Congress
1.

Making the Best Use of Courts’ and Congress’s Institutional Competences.—Judicial referrals of ambiguous statutes to Congress
would free courts from filling gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in statutory language—functions that the judiciary is comparatively less wellsituated to perform than Congress. Congress has the staff and the resources
to investigate problems that need legislative fixes, and then to deliberate
about the best policy to be enacted into law. Members of Congress represent constituencies with whom they remain in close contact, and thus have a
view of the interests and problems of those they represent. Judges, on the
other hand, cannot investigate policy choices because they do not have the
resources or authority to conduct hearings, nor do they have a constituency
to consult or to whom they are accountable. To the contrary, the defining
characteristics of the federal judiciary are that its members have life tenure
and salary protections that enable them to protect individual rights and apply laws fairly and consistently to all members of the population, even
when doing so is politically unpopular. For all these reasons, Congress is
the better institution to draft laws, and the judiciary is the better institution
to apply them.257
Yet when Congress enacts statutes that are unclear, or contain gaps or
inconsistencies, then courts are required to get into the business of making,
rather than interpreting, the law.258 For example, when the Supreme Court
decides that Title IX creates a cause of action for retaliation (as it did in
Jackson), or construes 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as expanding federal jurisdiction
(as it did in Exxon Mobil), or determines how long deportable aliens may be
detained (as it did in Zadvydas and Clark), it is acting more like a legislature than a court. Courts are less equipped to enact policy decisions than
Congress because they lack all the resources and information that Congress
has as its disposal. These cases force courts to go beyond interpretation, a
task for which they are well suited, and engage in lawmaking, a task for
which they are not.
257
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Furthermore, Courts are accused of judicial activism when they make
these sorts of substantive policy decisions because their critics fail to recognize that when statutes leave important questions unanswered—as did Title
IX, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the Immigration and Nationality Act—courts
have to reach some conclusion about how the statute should be applied, and
any decision forces courts into the position of legislating rather than interpreting. In other words, judges cannot avoid being activists when faced
with ambiguous statutes that must be applied to the case at hand. Instead of
being criticized for making these hard decisions, courts should be given the
alternative of referring questions of statutory ambiguity back to Congress so
that Congress can assume the lawmaking responsibility for which it, and
not the judiciary, is best suited.
2. Promoting Transparency.—Certifying questions to Congress provides a more straightforward method of dealing with statutory ambiguity
than the interpretive theories and canons of construction that courts normally employ. The latter techniques simply cannot resolve every statutory
interpretation problem.259 As discussed in Part II, there are times when
Congress has not foreseen the situation presented to the court, or perhaps
has deliberately chosen to leave an issue unclear, and thus neither the statutory text nor the legislative history can guide the court’s construction. In
such cases, courts generally make up an answer in the guise of “interpreting” the statute, often bending or breaking traditional interpretive tools to
do so.260 On other occasions, courts will misuse these techniques to avoid
constitutionally troubling or obviously unfair outcomes. Judges may succeed in convincing most casual observers that Congress, rather than the
judge, has enacted a law that the judge is merely “interpreting”—a judicial
deception that arguably undermines the democratic process.261 Those who
recognize that judges are making law, however, accuse the judiciary of imposing their own policy preferences while purporting to interpret statutes,
which undermines the legitimacy of all judicial decisionmaking.262 As a result, even those who approve of the results in such cases contend that courts
are perverting important tools of statutory construction by suggesting that
the meanings they arrive at are compelled by these interpretive techniques.
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By sending an ambiguous statute to Congress for clarification, a court
is declaring that it can find no answer to the question in the case before it
through traditional hermeneutic inquiries and that it thinks the issue is better
addressed in the first instance by the political branches. As a result, the
canons of statutory construction and other interpretive techniques will not
be devalued by being pressed into use in such cases, and the court will be
more honest with itself, the parties, the public, and Congress if it concedes
the impossibility of the interpretive task and asks Congress for assistance.
In Jackson, Exxon Mobil, and Clark, the majority and dissent reached
the opposite conclusions about the meaning of the statutes at issue after engaging in a careful parsing of the text, examination of legislative history,
and application of interpretive theories and canons of construction.263 A review of those decisions leaves the reader unconvinced that there was any
answer to be found using those sources. A more honest approach would
have been for the Court to throw up its hands, declare the impossibility of
the task, and seek congressional assistance.
Moreover, the possibility of judicial certification may keep Congress
more honest and transparent when enacting legislation. Legislators sometimes consciously choose ambiguity to mask their goals, or to be able to
claim to constituents that they accomplished something they did not, or to
build majority support for legislation that would otherwise fail to be enacted
into law.264 When courts are honest about ambiguity, they identify that the
problem is the legislature’s drafting of the original statute, rather than judicial failure to find and apply politically neutral and effective techniques of
statutory interpretation. By bringing the problem back to Congress’s attention, legislators will either have to face up to the hard choices required of
them, or, through silence, concede that they are unwilling to make legislation clear. In addition, the potential for referrals back to Congress may inspire the legislature to be clearer in the first instance—in part, because
referrals will draw their attention to drafting problems they will seek to
avoid in the future, and in part because the enacting Congress would rather
retain control of the statute’s meaning than cede that task to whichever future Congress receives the referral.
3. Promoting Democracy.—Certifying questions about statutory
meaning to Congress is more consistent with democratic ideals than the current practice, which transforms judges into legislators whenever Congress
enacts ambiguous statutes. Instead of an unelected judge simply drafting
263
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the missing language or altering the meaning of words to undo an absurdity
or inconsistency, elected members of Congress get to take the first shot at
clarifying statutory meaning.
Although Congress now has the option of overriding judicial interpretations that it does not like—and, as Eskridge demonstrated,265 Congress
sometimes chooses that path—legislative overrides are not a fail-safe
method for ensuring that elected branches have the last say about a law’s
meaning. Without the time pressure involved in the certification process,
Congress might not be able to overcome the legislative inertia that oftentimes prevents it from acting. Moreover, Congress might not be able to
override a judicial interpretation even when that interpretation is contrary to
the original intent of the enacting legislators and is disliked by the majority
of current legislators. As scholars of the legislative process have explained,
judicial decisions are hard to reverse because if even a small proportion of
the original legislative coalition prefers the court’s reading of the statute to
the legislative agreement, and if those lost votes cannot be replaced with
legislators who were originally opposed to the statute, then the judicial ruling will stand.266 Furthermore, the court’s opinion declaring the meaning of
the statute will change the default position and create new stakeholders who
are happy with the court’s view of the law, inhibiting the legislature’s ability to enact a statute to reestablish the original understanding of the legislation.
In contrast, when a court certifies questions about statutory meaning to
Congress, it encourages Congress to legislate before the court issues an
opinion (and enables Congress to do so by staying the case), leading to statutes that are drafted as a majority of elected members of Congress prefer
rather than as unelected judges choose to interpret them. Members of Congress will be inspired to amend the statute at issue, knowing that otherwise
the court will be forced to decide the question for it. Because legislators
cannot be certain how a court would decide the case without their assistance, they will be able to enact clarifying legislation free from a judicial interpretation that skews legislative coalitions.
Certifying questions to Congress accomplishes many of the same goals
lauded by dynamic statutory theorists, who recommend interpreting ambiguous statutes in light of current congressional preferences and social
norms rather than looking backward to glean the intent of the enacting legislature.267 Critics of this school of interpretive thought claim that it poses
an impossible task—how are judges supposed to determine the preferences
265
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of legislators, the general public, or both?—and so they suggest that dynamic theorists are really just empowering judges to craft new legislation in
accord with their own policy preferences.268 Certifying questions to Congress realizes the dynamic theorists’ goals, but does so in a way that should
satisfy these critics. Courts would no longer be trying to guess at current
legislative preferences, but instead would be asking for a clear statement
from the current Congress about how the interpretive problem should be resolved. If Congress does not respond, however, then courts have a newfound freedom through the implied delegation of legislative power to
engage in lawmaking that would otherwise be Congress’s prerogative.269
4. Improving Inter-Branch Communication.—Referrals would provide a new avenue of communication between courts and Congress, and
would do so in a manner likely to draw congressional attention to problem
statutes and generate legislation to resolve those problems.
Judges, members of Congress, and academics all agree that the judiciary and Congress do not communicate well. As Judge James L. Buckley of
the D.C. Circuit commented: “It is self-evident that these two institutions
will impact on one another in a dozen different ways. Yet, for whatever
strange reason, each institution tends to be miserably unacquainted with the
problems faced by the other.”270 Judge Frank M. Coffin, when serving as
Chair of the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch,
observed that “[t]he judiciary and Congress not only do not communicate
with each other on their most basic concerns; they do not know how they
may properly do so.”271 Studies reveal that neither members of Congress
nor their staffs are cognizant of the great majority of judicial decisions addressing legislation within the jurisdiction of their committees.272
In the mid-1980s, Robert Katzmann—now a Second Circuit Judge, but
at that time head of a non-profit organization engaged in examining relations between Congress and the Judiciary—began studying the interaction
between the D.C. Circuit and Congress, focusing on how Congress responded to D.C. Circuit opinions discussing problems with statutory language.273 He examined twenty cases in which the D.C. Circuit had issued
opinions that commented on a statutory gap, ambiguous language, a gram268

See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part V.B.4.
270
James L. Buckley, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the
District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 313 (May 22–24, 1988).
271
Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 21, 22 (Robert A. Katzmann
ed., 1988).
272
See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653 (1992) [hereinafter Katzmann, Bridging the
Statutory Gulf].
273
Id. at 656–57.
269

59

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

matical problem, or invited Congress to deal with a substantive issue in the
legislation. He then contacted staff members at the relevant House committees and discovered that in most cases the congressional staffs were unaware of the court’s decisions.274 Yet there is general agreement that
Congress would craft better statutes if judicial decisions addressing legislative problems were brought to staff members’ attention. Indeed, every
staffer interviewed by Katzmann thought that they should be aware of these
judicial decisions so that they could consider whether statutory revisions
were necessary.275
Certifying questions to Congress in pending cases is likely to capture
Congress’s attention and spur Congress to take immediate action to resolve
statutory ambiguity before a court issues a definitive decision on the issue.
As discussed in Part III, Congress already has the authority to amend statutory language whenever it feels it necessary to do so, yet Congress only
rarely uses its power to assist courts with statutory ambiguity.276 No
mechanism currently exists to draw Congress’s attention to judicial confusion about statutory meaning and at the same time push Congress to take
action quickly. Certification could accomplish those goals. If the Supreme
Court grants a petition for writ of certiorari and then stays the case to seek
Congress’s assistance with the statutory question, members of Congress and
their staffs will be alerted to the statutory problem and will know that if
they do not address it immediately, the Court will answer the question—
perhaps in ways that Congress does not prefer and yet that will be difficult
to override. The added publicity and time pressure that accompanies certification should provide the catalyst for congressional action that is lacking
from a Supreme Court decision to grant review alone.
Professor Elhauge has suggested that the granting of a petition for writ
of certiorari can be viewed as the “certification” of a question to Congress.277 In theory, the certiorari grant alone might inspire Congress to address the issue before the Court does and, as discussed in Part III, on
occasion Congress has taken action to preempt a Supreme Court decision.
But it is difficult for Congress to enact legislation within the short period
between the grant of certiorari and the issuance of a decision, and the new
stakeholders created after a decision is issued may make a congressional
override impossible.278 Moreover, it simply may not occur to members of
274
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Congress that they can and should take action at the very moment when another branch of government appears to have taken on the task of resolving
the problem. Establishing a formal certification process would alter the presumption that the judiciary, and not the legislature, will resolve questions
about statutory meaning at issue in pending litigation.
Even if Congress never responds to the judicial query, some members
of Congress and their staffs will be put on notice that a piece of legislation
is posing interpretive challenges. The communication from the court will
provide useful information to Congress about the issues courts grapple with
in interpreting and applying legislation, and may improve legislative drafting as a result. At the very least, then, referrals will make Congress aware
of the problem of statutory gaps or ambiguities, enabling Congress to avoid
repeating those drafting errors in future legislation.279
Suppose, for example, that rather than issuing an opinion in Jackson,
the Supreme Court instead asked Congress to clarify whether Title IX contained a cause of action for retaliation. Once the problem was brought to
Congress’s attention, it is possible that Congress could act quickly to establish whether such a claim existed, putting to rest the dispute that had split
the circuits. Moreover, courts frequently face questions about the content
and scope of private rights of action in federal statutes. Even if Congress
did not resolve the question in Jackson, the certification might alert Congress to the need to clarify these questions in future legislation.
5. Reducing Inter-Branch Conflict.—Referring questions of statutory
ambiguity to Congress has the potential to reduce inter-branch conflict.
Courts are more easily accused of “legislating from the bench” when they
are filling gaps or finding meaning where, in truth, none exists.280 Members
of Congress are more likely to criticize courts when they see judges interpreting ambiguous statutes in ways that they would not.281 The tension between the judicial and legislative branches is at its zenith when a court
concludes that a statute is unconstitutional and strikes it down.
Some of these problems could be avoided if Congress clarified ambiguous statutes in response to certified questions from courts, thereby obviating the need for courts to engage in quasi-legislative activity. The more
important the question of statutory meaning, the more likely Congress is to
take up the question and resolve it for the court. Consequently, divisive
questions of statutory meaning—such as whether Congress intended to create an implied private right of action or to allow for the indefinite detention

279

In this respect, referrals provide the same sort of notice as Katzmann’s program—except perhaps
in a manner that is likely to generate more legislative interest at the outset.
280
Maggs, supra note 9, at 129 (“[W]hen courts make rules in the absence—or perceived absence—of delegated authority, they may find themselves in the midst of controversy for ‘legislating
from the bench.’”).
281
See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1, at 1278 n.38 (1996).

61

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of deportable aliens—would no longer be subjects that the judiciary is
forced to decide on its own.
Admittedly, courts might send questions to Congress that are so controversial that Congress would prefer to punt the issue back to the judicial
branch. For example, members of Congress might not want to make a decision about whether a retaliation claim can be brought under Title IX or the
length of time an alien can be detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act out of fear of alienating some part of their constituencies. Conversely, some referrals might concern minor or technical questions of
statutory meaning—such as the complex applications of supplemental jurisdiction—that Congress simply does not have the time to address. But
even when Congress does not respond to a judicial inquiry, courts will forestall some criticism by first seeking congressional input. If a court asked
Congress to resolve the issue and Congress never responded, then the court
cannot be blamed for filling in gaps or assigning meaning to unclear language that Congress failed to fix. By making a good faith effort to obtain a
resolution of the problem through the political branches, the court will deflect some of the accusations of activism.
Referrals to Congress would be particularly helpful in avoiding the inter-branch conflict that arises whenever the judiciary confronts an ambiguous statute raising constitutional concerns. Because the court is being asked
to strike down legislation enacted by a co-equal branch of government,
these cases pit the judicial and legislative branches against one another.
The courts’ current method of dealing with this problem is to construe the
language to avoid the constitutional question282—a practice to which Alexander Bickel referred as one of the “passive virtues” that encourages Congress to give a “second look” to problem legislation.283 Only when
Congress makes crystal clear its intent to push the constitutional limits will
courts have to address the question whether the statute is unconstitutional,
and perhaps take the ultimate step of striking down the legislation. In other
words, courts use this interpretative technique as a method of side-stepping
a clash with Congress.
Yet, as was discussed in Part II, the constitutional avoidance doctrine
itself has been criticized as an example of judicial overreaching.284 Commentators question whether courts have the right to refuse to apply statutes
as they can most logically be read without definitively deciding whether
that construction would be unconstitutional. By purposely skewing the
meaning of statutes without first addressing whether the more straightforward reading is unconstitutional, critics contend that courts are essentially
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rewriting laws even when the Constitution might not require it—something
that courts have no authority to do.285
Sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a better
method of addressing ambiguous statutes that push constitutional limits.
These certified questions would give Congress the opportunity to decide
whether it wishes to tread near constitutional lines before the court rewrites
the statute.286 Because this is the goal, the Court should explain to Congress
that one interpretation of the statute may violate the Constitution so that
Congress is alert to the problem. Hopefully, Congress will then amend the
statute to avoid the constitutional problems that concern the court, thereby
circumventing a constitutional showdown.
As a result, courts would not have to distort the meaning of statutes to
avoid a constitutional problem that they might eventually conclude did not
exist in any case. For its part, Congress, not the courts, should be responsible for “clarifying” (or altering) statutes to avoid constitutional issues—
certifying questions about the meaning of ambiguous and constitutionallysuspect statutes to Congress allows Congress to take on that role.287
Were certification available, the Court could have granted the petition
in Clark v. Martinez—or, even better, in its precursor Zadvydas v. Davis—
285
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and then stayed the case and asked Congress to establish a clear limit on the
length of time that aliens could be detained. Certification would have allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional problem created by a statute that
appeared to permit indefinite detention. The judicial query would have notified Congress of the ambiguity in the statute and at the same time alerted
Congress to the Court’s constitutional concerns. Congress might have reacted by enacting legislation that clearly stated the permissible length of detention in most cases, clarified whether that period applied to admitted and
inadmissible aliens alike, and provided grounds for extending detention under certain extraordinary circumstances. Alternatively, if Congress had responded with legislation clearly permitting indefinite detention, then the
Court could have squarely addressed the constitutional question presented
by the statute.
B. The Costs of Certifying Questions to Congress
Certification does not come without costs. Certification will cause delays. It may politicize the judicial process. It may produce ill-considered
and hastily drafted legislation, or legislation driven by base majority preferences or the desire to please narrow interest groups. For these reasons, I
advocate that only the Supreme Court, and possibly also circuit courts acting en banc, be given the authority to certify questions to Congress, and that
these courts use this tool only in cases of truly intractable statutory ambiguity where it appears that Congress will do a better job of legislating a solution than a court.288
1. Delay.—Without question, certification to Congress will delay
resolution of cases in which the procedure is used. If Congress does not respond to the referral, then the delay will be minimal; a court should not halt
the case for any longer than six months without some indication that Congress intends to clarify the legislative ambiguity. If a bill to amend the statute is proposed and starts working its way through the committee process,
however, then the delay could end up being two years or more to allow for
the kind of deliberation the legislative process often demands.289 This addi288
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tional time is significant and rightfully a reason for courts not to certify
questions lightly.
But delay is not a reason to reject judicial referrals to Congress out of
hand. The use of abstention and certification to seek state-court views on
state law also slows down the judicial process—in the case of abstention, by
an average of six years290—and yet the consensus is that the benefit of obtaining state-court input justifies the added time it takes to decide the
case.291 The delay is considered worthwhile because these procedural devices give the ultimate, authoritative decision-maker the first chance to answer hard questions about statutory meaning—potentially even saving time
in the long run by avoiding the need for a state court to override a federal
court’s decision about state law. For the same reasons, the delay caused by
referring questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress is justified. Better to
have Congress make clear how it wants the statute to be applied than leave
a federal court to guess at the meaning in an unclear text, and then be overridden by a dissatisfied Congress.
Even though a referral to Congress postpones the resolution of a single
case, referrals have the potential to increase the overall speed of judicial decisionmaking. The referral may inspire Congress to enact a clarifying
amendment much earlier than it would have if left to address the issue on its
own timetable. In law, certainty and finality are beneficial.292 The sooner
Congress clarifies an unclear statute, the more quickly and easily courts can
resolve all current and future cases concerning that issue. Indeed, some
cases will never be filed simply because there is no longer any debate about
what the law means.293 Imagine, for example, that the Supreme Court or
one of the courts of appeals had certified a question to Congress about the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 soon after the issue began to perplex the
courts. If Congress had responded, it could have prevented more than a
decade of litigation. Even though certification would have delayed resolution of an individual case, an early response by Congress would have saved
many future litigants a lot of time.
Finally, Congress can minimize its response time to referrals about the
most basic type of scrivener’s errors and similarly uncontroversial clarifications to statutory text. Congress can expedite the enactment of corrective
legislation through procedures such as suspension of the rules or proceeding
the parties wind their way through the state court systems. In any case, one hopes that Congress could
and would act more quickly when a court has stayed a pending case for the purpose of obtaining legislative clarification.
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under unanimous consent.294 Even without those special procedures, one
long-time judicial staff member explained that “when most everyone [in
Congress] agrees to do something, legislation can be passed in a matter of
days.”295
Because delays are a legitimate concern, however, only a limited number of courts should have the power to certify questions to Congress, and
they should use that power only when presented with truly inscrutable statutes. Questions about statutory meaning should not be sent to Congress
unless there has been significant judicial disagreement over the text at issue
culminating in the kind of deep circuit split that the Supreme Court itself
requires before it will hear most cases.296 I recommend that the authority to
certify questions to Congress be limited to the Supreme Court and perhaps
also circuit courts acting en banc. A single district court, or even a single
panel of three appellate judges, should not have the power to defer the resolution of disputes for the purpose of seeking congressional input. With such
limits in place, certification should be an infrequent occurrence, and should
arise only in the kinds of cases presenting intractable problems of statutory
interpretation in which the benefits of certification outweigh the costs.
2. Politicizing the Judicial Process.—As previously discussed, certifying questions about statutory meaning to Congress promotes democracy
by providing an additional opportunity for the members of the elected, politically-accountable branches of government to be clear about the meaning
of the laws they enact.297 The other side of the coin is that transferring issues in pending cases to the halls of Congress will politicize the judicial
process. At least in theory—though admittedly not always in practice—
courts are the one forum in which the political power of the parties is irrelevant. But if a case is referred to the political branches for resolution, then
the relative political power of the parties comes back into play.298 One can
reasonably suspect that if a question of statutory ambiguity is sent to Con294
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gress, the party with the most money, connections, and influence will be
more likely to persuade Congress to “clarify” the ambiguous statute in a
way that favors that party and their interests.
A partial response to this criticism is that certification does not create a
new problem. Congress already can alter legislation to change the outcome
of pending cases, and, as a result, Congress is already lobbied by those who
fear they might lose in court.299 Admittedly, an established process by
which courts send questions to Congress would give Congress more notice,
opportunity, and incentive to take action, and so it would likely increase the
parties’ opportunities to apply political pressure to obtain the legislation
that will allow them to win their case. But these are not grounds for criticizing certification per se, but rather are problems that infuse the process of
democratic decisionmaking. Certification is a more democratic way of resolving statutory ambiguity, and thus it will be accompanied by all the
downsides of the democratic process, including lobbying by special interests.300
Indeed, certification could be considered a fairer method of notifying
Congress about problem legislation than the system we have now. Without
referrals to Congress, a politically powerful losing party has the incentive
and ability to get Congress to amend the legislation at issue, but losing parties without political influence will very likely be unable to do so.301 In his
study of the factors leading to congressional overrides of judicial decisions,
Eskridge discovered that politically powerful losers in court are more likely
to persuade Congress to override Supreme Court decisions than those who
lack access and clout.302 Judicial referrals give Congress notice and an opportunity to take action when a court decides that congressional input
would be helpful, and not just when one party has the political muscle to
bring the issue to Congress’s attention.
Moreover, a closer look at the relative political power of the parties in
Jackson provides some reassurance, because this case demonstrates that
even a single plaintiff will be able to call upon influential allies should the
need to lobby Congress arise. Although the case was brought by a single,
relatively powerless plaintiff against an institutional defendant, the plaintiff
had plenty of amici supporting him who could be expected to join in the
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lobbying effort should there need to be one.303 Nor was the defendant
school board so powerful and connected as to suggest that they would inevitably win the day in the halls of Congress—especially considering that
the United States supported the plaintiff. Clark, however, poses a more
worrisome problem, since it pitted an illegal alien against the executive
branch of the United States. The executive always has the inside track in
Congress, and particularly when the President’s party also controls both
Houses of Congress, as was the case when Clark was decided. We might
fear the power of the executive in a case like Clark to push through Congress a “clarification” that favors executive power at the expense of the individual litigant—particularly when the litigant is a politically powerless
alien.
Courts should therefore be circumspect about the cases they refer to
Congress. If they believe that one party has much greater political clout
than its opponent, they should hesitate to send the question about statutory
meaning to Congress out of fear that Congress will attempt to control the
outcome in the particular case rather than legislate for the general public
good. If the court is concerned that one party will out-lobby the other, or
that Congress will be tempted to reward or punish the individual litigants in
the case before the court, then the court should choose not to certify the
question in that case. In addition, courts should police the congressional response to a certified question to ensure that Congress has not sought to take
over the judicial function by controlling results in specific cases. As stated
in Part IV, Congress must legislate so as to affect more than just the case
before the court, which means that Congress should take into account the
broader public interest rather than just the interests of the parties in the
pending litigation. To ensure this result, courts must be vigilant in preventing Congress from encroaching on judicial territory by attempting to control
the outcome of a pending case without effecting a change in the underlying
legal standards.
3. Undermining Legislative Coherence and Consistency.—Judges are
valued for their role as guardians of the law’s continuity and coherence.
Judges integrate statutes into the greater fabric of the law and stabilize
statutory meaning through binding precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.304 A practice of certifying questions to Congress might undermine
these judicial attributes by giving Congress greater opportunity to alter
statutory meaning or, should Congress fail to respond when courts certify
303
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questions, by permitting courts to engage in creative lawmaking that undermines the laws’ consistency and coherence. Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation have been criticized for interfering with the development
of consistent and coherent interpretation,305 and a certification process could
similarly be criticized for disrupting settled expectations about the law.
The values of continuity and consistency in statutory interpretation are
at their least compelling in cases appropriate for certification, however.
Only the truly intractable questions of statutory ambiguity should be sent to
Congress; that is, only the questions for which reference to statutory structure, purpose, and history can provide no answer. In those kinds of cases,
courts reach different results about statutory meaning, and litigants and experts in the field have no clear conception of what the law means or how it
applies. Litigants cannot claim to have relied on amorphous statutory language for which courts had not adopted a consistent interpretation. For example, the defendant school district in Jackson could not have been certain
that Title IX did not encompass a private right of action for retaliation in
light of the circuit split on that question. Nor could the defendants in Exxon
Mobil have counted on a finding of no jurisdiction considering that
28 U.S.C. § 1367 is so far from clear. Judges should resort to certification
only when there is no stable, consistent legal interpretation to adhere to, and
when appellate courts have failed to build a coherent understanding of how
the statutory provision at issue can be interpreted so as to be situated within
a larger body of law.
Admittedly, Congress may choose to respond to the certification by
amending the law in ways that break from the spirit of the original, disrupting settled expectations. But this change in course cannot be criticized as a
failure of continuity in the same way that one might criticize a court were it
to overturn precedent and adopt a new interpretation of statutory meaning.
To state the obvious, statutes should be construed consistently only if the
statutory language remains unchanged; once Congress amends a statute,
any benefit of consistency is immediately outweighed by the value of adhering to currently-expressed preferences of the political branches.
4. Congress’s Failure to Respond.—If a certification procedure were
established, Congress might ignore certified questions in a significant number of cases, leaving the ambiguous statute to be construed and applied by
the court. The reality is that Congress has many legislative priorities and
may not be interested in expending time, resources, and political will on a
statute that a court finds confusing. Consequently, the certification process
may not accomplish the hoped-for goal of giving the elected branches an
opportunity to clarify indeterminate statutes. Indeed, many of the claimed
benefits of certification described above would fail to materialize.
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Yet even assuming Congress would not respond to most judicial queries, the very fact that Congress was asked to clarify a statute but did not do
so will have bearing on the judicial approach to the interpretive problem. I
contend that Congress’s failure to assist the court implicitly delegates the
lawmaking function to the courts, permitting judges to approach the ambiguous statute with greater flexibility and creativity and insulating them
from charges of judicial activism when doing so.
Others might object, arguing that congressional silence should not be
interpreted as giving courts free rein to engage in lawmaking. Legislative
inaction is weak evidence of congressional intent. When a court issues a
decision interpreting a statute and Congress never amends the statute to
undo that court decision, should we assume that Congress agrees with the
court’s reading of the legislation? What if Congress amends the statute but
does not alter the judicial construction? And how about if members of
Congress drafted a bill seeking to override the judicial construction, but the
bill never becomes law? Courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of
these different types of legislative inaction, sometimes treating congressional silence as a near-dispositive factor and other times concluding it has
no value whatsoever.306
The argument in favor of imbuing legislative inaction with legal significance is that, at least in some cases, it raises a strong inference that Congress approves of the judicial or executive branch’s statutory
interpretation.307 But as the Court has conceded, “[n]onaction by Congress
is not often a useful guide.”308 Courts frequently reject legislative acquiescence arguments, noting that members of Congress are likely to be unaware
of the judicial or agency interpretation at issue.309 And even when Congress
is cognizant of another branch’s reading of a statute, its failure to override
that interpretation might be due to pressing legislative priorities rather than
its approval. As one commentator noted, “[legislative] [a]cquiescence is the
rule and not the exception, whatever Congress’ feelings about a Supreme
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Court decision.”310 For these reasons, legal scholars have almost uniformly
concluded that acquiescence is not a good indicator of legislative agreement
with anything a court says.311
Reliance on legislative silence is also criticized as being at odds with
the democratic process. Lawmaking should be transparent and produce results for which elected officials can be held accountable. Congressional acquiescence is a nonevent that occurs without fanfare or press coverage,
permitting legislators to avoid responsibility because none will be on record
as having voted for another branch’s interpretation. Moreover, giving
weight to legislative silence conflicts with the constitutionally prescribed
roles of the legislative and executive branches in our system of government.
Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress plays the primary role in enacting legislation, but to do so it is required to win approval of both Houses
of Congress and the President (or override a presidential veto by a twothirds majority of both Houses). If a judicial or agency interpretation of a
statute is viewed as “law” simply because Congress did not pass a statute
rejecting that interpretation, then congressional inaction can bypass the
Constitution’s procedural hurdles to enacting legislation, and can eliminate
the President from the process altogether. “[I]n view of the specific and
constitutional procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would
seem hardly justifiable to treat as having legislative effect any action or
nonaction not taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures.”312
These are powerful criticisms of legislative acquiescence arguments,
and they have gained ascendancy along with the rise of textualism. But
they do not require courts to ignore the significance of congressional silence
in the context of certification. Congress’s “non-response” to a judicial
query about the meaning of a statute should be given legal weight by the
certifying court not because it tells that court anything about Congress’s
view of statutory meaning, but rather because it gives the court information
about the role Congress is willing to let the courts play in statutory interpretation.313
Normally, the judiciary serves as Congress’s agent by construing the
statute as instructed. Textualists believe that Congress can only instruct
through statutory text while intentionalists are willing to look at legislative
history as well, but under either theory courts are agents of the legislature.
Dynamic theorists such as Elhauge would ask courts to be agents of the cur310
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rent legislature by construing the law in the way the current legislature
would prefer. When a court refers an issue of statutory ambiguity to Congress, however, it is in essence telling Congress that it does not have
enough information to serve as a faithful agent (either to the enacting legislature or the current legislature), and that it cannot do Congress’s bidding
without clearer instructions. Congress’s refusal to provide direction in
these circumstances has meaning, I argue, because it forces the agent (the
court) to act without guidance from its principal (Congress). Congressional
silence lets the court know that it is free to craft its own substantive policy
where Congress has given the court none to apply. That is, the agent has
free rein to act in accord with its own views rather than those of its principal
when the principal has been unclear and refuses to give the agent further instructions.314
Significantly, the argument that courts have greater latitude to engage
in lawmaking when Congress has not responded to a judicial question about
statutory meaning is based primarily on the legislative action that led to the
court’s review of the problem legislation. To get to the point where the
court can, on its own, draft legislation to fill gaps or reconcile inconsistencies, Congress had to affirmatively enact two pieces of legislation. First, it
had to enact the statute at issue that the court is now trying to decipher; and
second, it had to enact legislation giving the federal courts jurisdiction over
litigation concerning the statute. It is the combination of a grant of jurisdiction to decide the case, a federal statute that the court is required to administer, and Congress’s refusal to answer the court’s request to clarify the
statute that leads to the inevitable conclusion that the court itself must legislate to resolve the ambiguity.
Congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, be it implicit or explicit, is nothing new. Courts view Congress as having delegated lawmaking power every time they give agencies deference to construe their
governing statutes or apply one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Federal judges are often described as politically unaccountable, but because
they are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, they can
claim at least some political legitimacy. Furthermore, judges often engage
in lawmaking when they believe Congress has given them that leeway—for
example, by enacting a broadly-worded statute such as the Sherman Act.315
The same rationale supports the federal courts’ authority to craft federal
common law—an authority that arises from the need to fill interstices in
federal statutory schemes and the reality that courts are the only federal institution capable, at the time the case is before it, of filling those gaps. So
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there is nothing shocking about the judiciary taking over the lawmaking
function when Congress has failed to clarify the meaning of the statutory
text courts must apply.316
The proposal here does not require courts to seek congressional input
when fleshing out the meaning of broadly-worded statutes like the Sherman
Act.317 But when Congress has enacted a detailed statute that does not appear to grant courts lawmaking authority, it makes sense for courts to seek
congressional input before engaging in lawmaking. If an agent receives detailed directions from its principal, but some portions of those directions are
less than clear, it is reasonable to think that the agent should first seek clarification before attempting to guess at, or manufacture, the missing pieces.
Only when the principal refuses to clarify is the agent truly free to improvise.
As a pragmatic matter, a nonresponse to a judicial referral also provides the courts with political cover to engage in more freewheeling and
creative statutory interpretation. Critics will find it less easy to criticize
courts for “activist” interpretations of statutes if the courts have first sought
legislative clarification of ambiguous statutory text. Although courts dealing with statutory ambiguity might be fairly described as “legislating from
the bench,” it is clear that they are doing so out of necessity, and not because they are seeking to arrogate legislative power. Courts will never, of
course, be free from criticism by those who dislike their rulings, but judicial
efforts to seek answers from the political branches would blunt attempts to
claim that judges are usurping the legislative role.
Imagine that in 2004 the Supreme Court had asked Congress to clarify
Title IX, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the Immigration and Nationality Act to resolve the questions at issue in Jackson, Exxon Mobil, and Clark. And imagine that Congress had not responded and the Court had gone ahead and
decided those cases just as it did. Would commentators have been as free
with their criticism? Possibly. But the Court would have had the added legitimacy that comes with an attempt to defer to another branch of government that is unwilling, or unable, to fulfill its assigned constitutional role.
And the opinions themselves would have made less of an effort to pretend
to “construe” inscrutable statutes, and would have been more forthright in
describing what the Court was actually doing—supplying law where Congress had failed to do so.
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CONCLUSION
When courts are faced with truly inscrutable statutes, they currently
have no choice but to apply the canons of construction and interpretive
theories to justify reaching a result in the case before them. As a few judges
admit, however, there are some cases in which the tools of statutory construction can supply no answer to the question at hand. Permitting courts to
certify questions about statutory meaning to Congress opens a channel of
communication with Congress and provides the judiciary with an alternative method of resolving hard cases. Certification seems particularly appropriate when it would allow a court to avoid deciding difficult
constitutional questions or where Congress has left significant policy questions unanswered—questions that Congress, not the courts, is better suited
to answer. Moreover, by seeking congressional input, courts protect themselves against charges of judicial overreaching that usually accompany judicial lawmaking.
Although turning to Congress to resolve pending cases appears at first
glance to require a dangerous blurring of legislative and judicial functions,
it merely harnesses Congress’s already-existing authority to create new law
to govern pending cases—a power that Congress has consistently exercised
since the foundation of our constitutional democracy. For better or worse,
Congress is already in the business of amending statutes that affect cases
before the courts, and the parties to litigation are already lobbying Congress
to change the laws at issue in their cases. Considering that Congress is currently assisting the courts by clarifying statutory language at issue in pending cases, albeit in an informal and ad hoc way, it makes sense to formalize
the process and give the judiciary a role in determining when congressional
input might be of assistance.
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